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PREFACEFor more than 50 years, DIA officers have met the full range of security challenges facing our great nation. Our intelligence professionals operate across the globe, and our work supports customers from the forward-deployed warfighter to the national policymaker. DIA is united in a common vision—to be the indispensable source of defense intelligence expertise—and for the past five decades we have done just that.

As part of this vision, DIA has a long history of producing comprehensive and authoritative defense intelligence overviews. In September 1981, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger asked the Defense Intelligence Agency to produce an unclassified overview of the Soviet Union’s military strength. The purpose was to provide America's leaders, the national security community, and the public a complete and accurate view of the threat. The result: the first edition of Soviet Military Power. DIA produced over 250,000 copies, and it soon became an annual publication that was translated into eight languages and distributed around the world. In many cases, this report conveyed the scope and breadth of Soviet military strength to U.S. policymakers and the public for the first time.

Today, we are faced with a complexity of intelligence challenges from multiple threats that we cannot afford to misunderstand. In the spirit of Soviet Military Power, DIA is proud to produce an unclassified defense intelligence overview of the military capabilities associated with the challenges we face—beginning with Russia. This product is intended to foster a dialogue between U.S. leaders, the national security community, partner nations, and the public about the challenges we face in the 21st century.

RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

The international order established after the Second World War and developed throughout the Cold War largely ensured widespread peace and stability even as it saw new conflicts—large and small—take place in different regions of the world. This post-war era, underwritten primarily by the strength of the United States, also gave rise to the greatest period of prosperity in history, witnessing countries rebuild from war and emerge from colonialism to become vibrant and valuable members of the international community. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States emerged as a world leader militarily, economically and diplomatically. Today, however, the United States faces an increasingly complex array of challenges to our national security.

The resurgence of Russia on the world stage—seizing the Crimean Peninsula, destabilizing eastern Ukraine, intervening on behalf of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, and shaping the information environment to suit its interests—poses a major challenge to the United States. Moscow will continue to aggressively pursue its foreign policy and security objectives by employing the full spectrum of the state’s capabilities. Its powerful military, coupled with the actual or perceived threat of intervention, allows its whole-of-government efforts to resonate widely.

Russia continues to modernize its extensive nuclear forces and is developing long range precision-guided conventional weapons systems. It is manipulating the global information environment, employing tools of indirect action against countries on its periphery and using its military for power projection and expeditionary force deployments far outside its borders. Its ultimate deterrent is a robust nuclear force capable of conducting a massed nuclear strike on targets in the United States within minutes.

Within the next decade, an even more confident and capable Russia could emerge. The United States needs to anticipate, rather than react, to Russian actions and pursue a greater awareness of Russian goals and capabilities to prevent potential conflicts. Our policymakers and commanders must have a complete understanding of Russia’s military capabilities, especially as U.S. and Russian forces may increasingly encounter each other around the globe. DIA will continue to provide our leaders decision-space, ensuring they have the time and information necessary to protect our nation. The wrong decisions—or the right ones made too late—could have dire consequences.

This report examines a resurgent Russia’s military power to foster a deeper understanding of its core capabilities, goals, and aspirations in the 21st Century.

Vincent R . StewartLieutenant General , USMC Director Defense Intel l igence Agency

Vladimir Putin’s address to the Russian Federal Assembly following the referendum on annexation of Crimea, 18 March, 2014:

“The USA prefers to follow the rule of the strongest and not by the international law. They are convinced that they have been chosen and they are exceptional, that they are allowed to shape the destiny of the world, that it is only them that can be right. They act as they please. Here and there they use force against sovereign states, set up coalitions in accordance with the principle: who is not with us is against us.”

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RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

VII

Introduction/Historical Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . .91991–Present: Fall and Rise of the Russian Military . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Russian National Military Overview . . . . . . . . . . . 14Russia’s Threat Perceptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

National Security Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Stability Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

External Defense Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Defense Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Military Doctrine and Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22Russian Perceptions of Modern Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Military and Security Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23Main Operations Directorate 25

National Military Command and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25Russian Nuclear Command and Control 26Command and Control of Joint Forces 27

Core Russian Military Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . 29Nuclear Forces and Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Biological and Chemical Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Anti-Access/Area Denial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32Information Operations 32Strategic Air Operations 32Integrated Air Defense System 33Modern Precision Strike Capabilities 33

CONTENTS

VIII

Precision Strike . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Space/Counterspace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Cyber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37Propaganda Helps Shape The Information Environment 38Cyber-Enabled Psychological Operations 39Information Defense 40Media Laws—A Hedge Against Instability 41

Indirect Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Electronic Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Power Projection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Underground Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Denial and Deception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Outlook: A Modernizing Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46Appendix A: Russian Strategic Rocket Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Appendix B: Russian Ground Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

Appendix C: Russian Aerospace Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

Appendix D: Russian Navy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

Appendix E: Russian Special Operations Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Appendix F: Russian Intelligence Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

Appendix G: Defense Industry and Modernization Programs . . . . . . . . . . 75

Appendix H: Arms Sales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

Introduction/Historical Overview1991-Present: Fall and Rise of the Russian Military

ollowing the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the Russian Federation inher-ited several formidable tasks and chal-

lenges from its Soviet predecessor. For the new-ly-formed Russian Ministry of Defense, the most immediate challenge was to relocate military equipment and personnel from the newly inde-pendent states of the former USSR and coun-tries of the disbanded Warsaw Pact into a new Russian state.1 The assets of the Soviet Union’s

nuclear arsenal were of particular importance. Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, the four states with nuclear weapons in their territory, eventually reached an agreement to dismantle all tactical and strategic nuclear weapons in the non-Russian republics or return them to Russia.2 The issue of conventional mili-tary forces was much more problematic. Forces returning from Eastern Europe had to be rein-tegrated into the new Russian military, while

Kremlin Guards in 2017. Military power has always been regarded as of critical importance by Russian and Soviet leaders, but after the collapse of the USSR, Moscow was left with a dramatically weakened military.

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those in the newly independent states were viewed as the basis for building national mili-taries for new sovereign countries.3

Returning military forces from Eastern Europe were often shipped piecemeal back to unprepared bases in the Russian Feder-ation.4 Other units located in the territory of the former Soviet Union were absorbed by the newly independent states. In certain cases, units such as the Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine or the 14th Army in Moldova actively resisted the attempts by the Soviet successor states to absorb these forces. Some of these stranded units became embroiled in ethnic conflicts in Moldova, Georgia, and Tajikistan.5 Most sig-nificantly for the new Russian military, inte-rior military districts, which under the Soviet Union contained low-readiness mobilization forces such as the Moscow and North Cauca-sus Military Districts, now became “front-line” districts bordering foreign states.6 The Rus-sian Federation emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union with a much smaller military and an entirely new set of security challenges.7

Russia’s new military faced dramatic budget-ary, readiness, and personnel shortfalls, as well as uncertainty of its role as Moscow strug-gled to determine its place in the post-Cold War world.8, 9 Russia cut military spending drasti-cally during the decade of post-Soviet economic turbulence. Fielding of new weapons systems slowed to a trickle and eventually halted; the huge former Soviet arms industry struggled, focusing on gaining hard currency by selling its most modern weapons to foreign buyers.10 At the same time, Russian military units lacked

funding and fuel to train and exercise, and pay was often months in arrears. The readiness of the force was minimal, and the popular image of the Russian military of the 1990s remains ships rusting at pier side, pilots unable to fly, and Russian officers moonlighting with second jobs to make ends meet.11

Moscow also had difficulty manning its mil-itary. Press reports on military life that began to appear during the glasnost (openness) era of the late 1980s highlighted the harshness of the conscript’s lot, and in particular the brutal and sometimes deadly dedovschina hazing of new draftees. Draft evasion became endemic, with many young Russian men using any and all legal or illegal measures to avoid military service.12, 13

Troops gathered around a fire for warmth during the Chechen conflict; the difficulties Moscow’s weakened military faced during its operations against the sep-aratist republic underscored its deterioration during the 1990s.

Image Source: Shutterstock

RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

Russian generals voiced complaints about the poor quality of the conscripts they actually received, as they were often unhealthy, poorly educated, and sometimes arrived with crimi-nal records.14 The military’s most painful trial, however, was caused by insurgency within the borders of the Russian Federation. From 1994 to 1995, undermanned and poorly trained Russian forces struggled to take and secure the breakaway Chechen Republic in the North Caucasus.15 The military’s problems and lim-itations were widely publicized by the Russian and international press, further undermin-ing its reputation and reinforcing the desire of young Russians to avoid service.

Throughout the post-Soviet era, there was a recognized need to reform and modernize the military.16 Not only did the Russian mili-tary suffer from the readiness and manpower

shortfalls outlined above, but Moscow’s forces retained their cumbersome Soviet-era organi-zation, designed for the mobilization of mas-sive numbers of reservists to conduct deep mechanized theater operations in the context of a major war.17 The 1990s and first decade of the 21st century saw a series of military reform efforts announced, discussed, and only abort-ively implemented. Russia’s first Minister of Defense, General Pavel Grachev, (1992–1996) posited the creation of a fully manned and equipped small “mobile force” component that could rapidly move to a conflict area and hold the line until additional forces mobilized;18, 19, 20

Minister of Defense Igor Sergeyev (1997–2001) created a new strategic nuclear deterrence force based on his previous service, the Strate-gic Rocket Forces;21, 22 and Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov (2001–2007) and Chief of the General Staff Yuriy Baluyevsky (2004–2008) pushed for the establishment of new regional theater commands and filling the military’s ranks with professional “contract” person-nel.23, 24 By the late 2000s, these reform plans remained largely unimplemented, unsuccess-ful, or abandoned.

One arguable exception to this series of mil-itary reform failures was the effort during the late 1990s to create “permanently ready forces,” a subset of the Russian force struc-ture made up of units with better manning and equipment levels.25, 26 These units were created and used during the second Chechen conflict (1999–2004) and enabled Moscow to intervene more rapidly and with more capa-ble forces than during the first Chechen War (1994–1995).27

Russian SS-25 ICBM launcher; given the weakened state of its conventional forces in the years after the collapse of the USSR, Moscow prioritized the mainte-nance of its nuclear capabilities.

Image Source: Shutterstock

Despite modest improvements and a measure of success in the second Chechen conflict, the Russian military still entered the first decade of the 21st century with a Soviet-era mobiliza-tion force structure almost completely equipped with dated Soviet-era equipment. Shortfalls in modern command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) equipment and capa-bilities were particularly notable. Russian mil-itary limitations were fully on display during the August 2008 “five-day war” with Georgia.28

Russian forces prevailed and defeated their rel-atively weak Georgian opponents, but after-ac-tion analysis by the Russian military high-lighted many failings. Air and artillery strikes missed their targets, an army commander had to resort to a cell phone to contact a higher headquarters,29 and several aircraft were lost to Georgian air defenses. While internationally

Transition to the New Look Program

Moscow’s limitations in modernizing its military had led to heavy dependence on its aging nuclear forces to defend the state. But while the presence of a robust nuclear deterrent dissuaded potential aggressors from directly attacking the Russian Federation, it was not flexible enough for Moscow to use in small, local conflicts such as Georgia or as a tool of power projection. The New Look program was a comprehensive and massive effort, aimed to change the Russian military from a Cold War-style mobilization force to a more ready, modern, and professional military able to respond to 21st century conflicts.30 Par-tially-manned Soviet-style divisions were reorganized into what were planned to be ful-ly-manned brigades; officer ranks were trimmed from 350,000 billets to initially 150,000, although later the number rose to 220,000; the contract manning effort was reshaped and reinvigorated, with a goal of 425,000 professional enlisted personnel in the force by 2017;31 the six extant military districts were reshaped initially into four joint strategic commands, which controlled all military assets in their areas in peace and war; and lastly, a massive state armaments program was initiated, allocating 1.1 trillion rubles over 10 years, aiming at fielding a Russian military with 70% new or modernized equipment by 2020.32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37

Minister of Defense Shoygu at the 2014 Victory Day Parade; since 2012, Shoygu has presided over the continued modernization of the Russian military as well as its operations in Ukraine and Syria.

Image Source: Shutterstock

RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

many were impressed by the ability of the Russian military, so derelict in the 1990s, to accomplish its mission, Moscow was spurred by what it viewed as critical shortfalls in Geor-gia to rapidly push forward a whole new set of reforms—known as the “New Look”—which had been under discussion before the conflict.38

The New Look was controversial and painful for many in or associated with the Russian military establishment.39, 40, 41 Even military education and medical support organiza-tions became targets for major reductions. In late 2012, the unpopular Minister of Defense associated with the reform effort, Anatoliy Serdyukov, left office and the former head of the Emergency Situations Ministry, Sergey Shoygu, took over.42 Shoygu proved adept at easing some of the most unpopular aspects of the New Look while largely retaining and refining the essence of the reform program.43

The years of Shoygu’s tenure have seen the New Look military engaged in a series of active operations. In early 2014, Russian naval infan-try, special forces, and airborne troops rapidly seized control of the Crimean Peninsula.44 While they faced almost no opposition, the operation gave the world its first look at a mil-itary that appeared surprisingly disciplined and well-equipped for those whose image of

Russian forces was formed during the years of decay in the 1990s. Although their presence was denied by Moscow, Russian special forces and troops operated to mobilize, lead, equip, and support separatist militias in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine from spring 2014 to the present. Ukrainian forces have stressed the capabilities of the Russian-enabled sepa-ratist units, especially with respect to C4ISR, artillery firepower, and air defense.45, 46 In Sep-tember 2015, Moscow launched its first expedi-tionary operation since the Soviet era, deploy-ing fixed-wing and helicopter aviation assets to Syria. Combined with other military support to the Asad regime such as intelligence infor-mation, advisors, ammunition, and artillery, Russian action arrested the decline in the Syrian regime’s military position.47

The Russian military today is on the rise—not as the same Soviet force that faced the West in the Cold War, dependent on large units with heavy equipment, but as a smaller, more mobile, balanced force rapidly becoming capa-ble of conducting the full range of modern war-fare. It is a military that can intervene in coun-tries along Russia’s periphery or as far away as the Middle East. The new Russian military is a tool that can be used to underpin Moscow’s stated ambitions of being a leading force in a multipolar world.

Russia National Military OverviewRussia’s Threat Perceptions

Russia has established five Joint Strategic Commands (Obyedinennoye Strategicheskoye Komandovaniye – OSK) to deal with perceived threats from the west, south, east, and Arctic.48

Russian Joint Strategic Commands1612-11168

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ince returning to power in 2012, Rus-sian President Putin has sought to reassert Russia as a great power on

the global stage and to restructure an interna-tional order that the Kremlin believes is tilted

too heavily in favor of the United States at Russia’s expense.49 Moscow seeks to promote a multi-polar world predicated on the principles of respect for state sovereignty and non-inter-ference in other states’ internal affairs, the

RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

primacy of the United Nations, and a careful balance of power preventing one state or group of states from dominating the international order.50 To support these great power ambi-tions, Moscow has sought to build a robust military able to project power, add credibility to Russian diplomacy, and ensure that Rus-sian interests can no longer be summarily dis-missed without consequence.51

Russia’s assertive promotion of its national interests, punctuated by its military actions in Ukraine and Syria, demonstrates a more con-fident and somewhat less risk averse Kremlin, but it also has revived international concerns about the re-emergence of a more militaristic Russia. Russian military forces played a key role in the seizure of Crimea and fomenting an artificial separatist revolt in eastern Ukraine, blunting Kyiv’s aspirations to join NATO, at least for the foreseeable future.52 Addition-ally, Russia’s military intervention in Syria has changed the entire dynamic of the conflict, bolstering the Asad regime and ensuring that no resolution to the conflict is possible with-out Moscow’s agreement. Nevertheless, these actions also belie a deeply entrenched sense of insecurity regarding a United States that Mos-cow believes is intent on undermining Russia at home and abroad.53

Moscow undoubtedly views the United States and its NATO partners as the principle threat to Russian security, its geo-political ambitions, and most importantly, the Kremlin’s contin-ued hold on power. This perception of vul-nerability vis-à-vis the United States is most clearly evident in the latest Russian National

Security Strategy published in December 2015. The document identifies the United States and its NATO allies as Russia’s main threat, and accuses the West of pursuing a deliberate pol-icy of containment against Russia to sustain its domination of the post-Cold War interna-tional order and deprive Moscow of its rightful place on the world stage.54, 55 It explicitly states, “the Russian Federation's implementation of an independent foreign and domestic policy is giving rise to opposition from the United States and its allies, who are seeking to retain their dominance in world affairs.” The security strategy also cites the buildup of NATO mili-tary capabilities closer to the Russian border, the deployment of U.S. missile defense capabil-ities in Europe, and the ongoing U.S. pursuit of strategic non-nuclear precision weapon sys-tems as a serious threat to Russian security.56

Russia also has a deep and abiding distrust of U.S. efforts to promote democracy around the world and what it perceives as a U.S. campaign to impose a single set of global values. Moscow worries that U.S. attempts to dictate a set of acceptable international norms threatens the foundations of Kremlin power by giving license for foreign meddling in Russia’s internal affairs. The December 2015 National Security Strategy warns of the importance of preserving tradi-tional Russian spiritual and cultural values against foreign Western ideas and influences aimed at undermining Russia from within.57 The Kremlin is convinced the United States is laying the groundwork for regime change in Russia, a conviction further reinforced by the events in Ukraine. Moscow views the United States as the critical driver behind the crisis in

Ukraine and the Arab Spring and believes that the overthrow of former Ukrainian President Yanukovych is the latest move in a long-es-tablished pattern of U.S.-orchestrated regime change efforts, including the Kosovo campaign, Iraq, Libya, and the 2003–05 “color revolutions” in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan.58

Russian threat perceptions are not limited to the United States, and Moscow views the danger posed by Islamic militants and terrorists with grave concern.59 The Kremlin is particularly sen-sitive to the growth and spread of these ideologies and their potential to further radicalize Russian Muslims in the turbulent North Caucasus and other Muslim areas of central Russia. Russian military operations in Syria are also intended to eliminate jihadist elements operating there that originated in the territory of the former Soviet Union, to prevent them from returning home and posing a threat to Russia. At the same time, Mos-cow remains anxious about the deteriorating situ-ation in Afghanistan and the potential for Afghan-based Islamic extremists to spill over into the Central Asian states of the former Soviet Union and ultimately into Russia.60

Russian threat perceptions with regard to China are more divided and nuanced. Russian officials regularly praise the cooperative nature of the bilateral relationship, and Putin himself has declared that the current Russian-Chinese relationship is the best it has been in decades. In fact, the Russian National Security Strategy lists developing a strategic partnership with China as one of Russia’s most important goals.61 Moscow and Beijing share a common interest in weaken-ing U.S. global influence and are actively coop-

erating in that regard.62, 63 Military cooperation between the two countries is slowly expanding, as are economic ties.64 Nevertheless, some Rus-sians are keenly aware of the growing power dis-parity between Russia and an ascendant China and worry that Moscow is at risk of becoming Bei-jing’s junior partner.65 Others continue to harbor suspicions that China over the longer term will once again become a military threat to Russia.66, 67

National Security Strategy

Russia’s current National Security Strategy was signed by President Vladimir Putin on 31 Decem-ber 2015 as an update to the previous National Security Strategy published in 2009. The National Security Strategy is the Kremlin’s foundational planning document and is intended for domes-tic and external audiences.68 It codifies Moscow’s strategic interests and national priorities for at least the next 6 years. The national priorities were consistent with those identified in previous strategies; however, the tone of this update was harsher than the 2009 strategy, reflecting Mos-cow’s view of worsening relations with the West.

The 2015 strategy identifies Russian national interests as strengthening the country’s defense, ensuring political and social stability, raising the living standard, preserving and developing cul-ture, improving the economy, and strengthening Russia’s status as a leading world power. These national interests are to be achieved through con-centration on eight strategic national priorities:

• National defense

• State and public security

RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

• Economic growth

• Science, technology, and education

• Healthcare

• Culture

• Ecology of living systems and rational use of natural resources

• Strategic stability and equal strategic partnership

In the 2015 document, the sections on national defense, internal stability, economy, and culture were significantly expanded.69 Moscow identified new threats to state and public security posed by foreign nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), “color revolutions,” and the use of social media to foment unrest and undermine political and social stability,70 reflecting Russian officials’ allegations that Western powers seek to provoke regime change in Russia.71 The culture priority contains some of the strategy’s most significant revisions, emphasizing the need to preserve and strengthen “traditional Russian spiritual and moral values,” and indicating that Moscow views culture, lan-guage, and history as a tool for influence.

Unlike the 2009 version, the new National Secu-rity Strategy directly accuses the United States and NATO of pursuing actions that cause insta-bility and threaten Russian national security.72 The importance of a strong military for a lead-ing world power is acknowledged; the strategy states that “the role of force as a factor in inter-national relations is not declining.” The new strategy reiterated key concepts outlined in Rus-sia’s 2014 military doctrine on the importance of deterrence and conflict prevention, nuclear and nonnuclear deterrence, and the need to improve

Russia’s mobilization process.73 The National Security Strategy reflects a Russia more confi-dent of its ability to defend its sovereignty, resist Western pressure, and contribute to the resolu-tion of conflicts abroad (or insecurity).

Stability Issues

The Kremlin views internal political stability as a critical component of national strength and pro-jecting power abroad, as evidenced by the empha-sis placed on it in the National Security Strategy. Since returning to the presidency in 2012, Russian President Putin has worked to consolidate power. His efforts to further centralize control have been challenged by a slowing economy, lower energy prices, and growing public discontent with a sys-tem that lacks any genuine pluralism.74 Putin has tried to deflect from these concerns by promising to restore Russia to great power status, on par with the United States, to mobilize public support and secure his legitimacy.75, 76

The Kremlin has taken steps to neutralize polit-ical opposition by expanding laws to impose harsh sentences that discourage public pro-tests and encourage self-censorship.77 It has also restructured its internal security forces to ensure a more loyal and responsive apparatus. Russia maintains security forces that are not subordinate to the military to conduct a range of internal security and policing functions. None-theless, the Kremlin will likely face continu-ing challenges to its rule from democracy and anti-corruption activists, labor unrest, as well the ever present threat of terrorism emanating from Russia’s restive North Caucasus region.

Insurgency in the South

Russia’s enduring insurgency in its restive North Caucasus region continues at a consistent but low level. Stemming directly from its two conflicts in Chechnya in 1994–96 and then reig-niting in 1999, Moscow largely declared an end to major operations by 2009, although it still retains a sizeable military and security force structure and counterterrorism regime in the region.84 Still a volatile region, a general level of order is maintained via a mix of local and federal-level Russian forces, including Chechen forces loyal to Moscow headed by Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov.85

Once the center of insurgent activity, levels of instability in Chechnya gradually have plateaued over the years, while those in its neighboring Muslim provinces such as Dagestan and Ingushe-tia have experienced sporadic upswings in activity over time. Although large groups of insur-gents are now primarily a thing of the past, smaller bands still exist with affiliations to various nationalist and extremist groups such as ISIS-Caucasus and the Imarat Kavkaz. These groups and their members conduct small-scale operations and bombings against Russian forces—pri-marily from the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) police or the National Guard. Although daily attacks have largely abated since late 2013, pervasive socio-economic issues, corruption, and heavy-handedness (real or perceived) by Russian authorities will continue drive feelings of disen-franchisem*nt amongst the populace, providing a steady source for radicalization in the region.

Ministries with Internal Security Missions1612-11145

Ministry/Agency MissionPersonnel (Number of Troops)

National GuardRegime and internal security, federal law enforcement

(200,000)78

Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD)

Civil policing and local law enforcement

904,80079

Federal Security Services (FSB) Border Troops

Border security: ground and maritime (170,000)*80

Ministry of Justice (UIN) Civil judicial system, prison guarding 32,000*81

Ministry of Emergency Situations (EMERCOM)

Civil defense, disaster response, humanitarian relief, firefighting

289,000 (7,500)82

Federal Protection Service (FSO)

Presidential, VIP, and regime protection

20,00083

*Estimate

RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

External Defense Relations

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was a regional coordination body cre-ated among a number of the former Soviet states in the wake of the dissolution of the former Soviet Union. Nine states remain members, with Ukraine and Turkmenistan retaining associate member status. Russia’s most important defense and security rela-tionships are with its allies in the CIS Collec-tive Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)—Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Based on the 1992 Tashkent Collective Security Agreement, the CSTO was established in 2002 as part of a larger Rus-sian effort in the post-Soviet environment to create a more structured military organi-zation capable of implementing the security guarantees stipulated in the agreement. Since then, the CSTO has developed a bureaucratic staff under the organization’s secretary gen-eral and a rapid reaction force to respond to various contingencies that might impact the security of the member states. The CSTO con-ducts yearly joint military exercises address-ing various scenarios such as peacekeeping or counterterrorism operations.86 Russia also maintains an airbase at Kant, Kyrgyzstan, under the auspices of the CSTO.

Nonetheless, Russian efforts to build the CSTO into a more structured and capable organization on par with NATO largely have floundered. Some of the non-Russian member states worry that Moscow is using the orga-nization to undermine their sovereignty and

independence and are cautious of deepening military cooperation with Russia, as evidenced by Uzbekistan’s withdrawal in 2007. Differ-ing threat perceptions, an absence of trust amongst the members, and funding shortfalls have further plagued the organization.87, 88, 89, 90

Russia also is building cooperative defense relationships with other various countries throughout the Middle East, Latin America, Africa, and Asia, but its engagement is far less robust than in the former Soviet Union. Mos-cow appears to no longer be interested in fund-ing Soviet-style patronage relationships, and Russian policy remains largely transactional aimed at expanding arms sales and other Rus-sian economic interests, which has contributed to the limited nature of these ties.91, 92 Never-theless, the Kremlin continues to view its mil-itary outreach to these countries as important to enhancing its global stature and strengthen-ing its regional influence.

Defense Budget

Russian government spending on national defense has generally grown over the last decade and in 2016 reached a post-Soviet record. This increase in defense spending was enabled by both a general increase in the size of Russia’s GDP and a political deci-sion to increase the defense burden—the share of national wealth devoted to defense.

In 2015, Russian defense spending reached a then-record $52 billion (in 2017 dollars) and the defense burden was nearly 4% of GDP.

The 2016 budget, which was initially to decrease defense spending, was amended late in the year to increase defense spend-ing to $61 billion, a 4.5% defense burden on GDP.93, 94, 95 By contrast, in 2006 defense spending was $27 billion, and the defense burden was 2.4%.96, 97

Moscow’s ambitious rearmament program has driven the increase in defense spending. The Strategic Armament Program (SAP) called for spending 19.4 trillion rubles (equivalent to $285 billion) to rearm Ministry of Defense forces from 2011 through 2020. Each year the SAP is implemented through the State Defense Order (SDO), Moscow’s purchase of new weap-onry, investment in weapons-related research

and design, and expenditure on modernization and repair of existing weaponry.101 Funding for the 10 year program was heavily back-loaded such that just 31% was to be spent in the first 5 years (2011–2015) and nearly 70% was to be spent from 2016 to 2020.102 In order for Mos-cow to meet its original target for SAP spend-ing and maintain its operational spending at current levels, defense spending from 2016 through 2020 will have to increase substan-tially over 2011–2015 levels.

Russian defense spending, however, is poised to decrease in 2017.103 The 2017 budget calls for 2.8 trillion rubles to be spent on national defense, equivalent to $42 billion.104 This con-stitutes a 30% real cut in defense spending

Russia's Official Defense Spending 2006-2017 (billions of 2017 dollars)98, 99, 100

1612-11108

27.026 29.024 30.754 34.412 32.375 33.345 37.862 40.762 43.416 51.519 60.825 42.278

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 20172016

Real defense expenditures US$ % of GDP (nominal NCU based expenditures)#

2.42.3

2.4

2.9

2.62.5

2.8

3.03.1

3.8

4.5

3.1

RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

from 2016 levels, and if it is not amended to increase funds mid-year, it would be the lowest budget for national defense since 2013.105, 106, 107 According to Russian press and Ministry of Finance announcements, from 2017 through 2019 Russian defense spending will be essen-tially frozen in nominal terms—and therefore declining in real terms.108, 109

Russian government revenues are highly dependent on oil prices, and Moscow’s deci-

sion to base its budget for 2017–2019 on low projected oil prices in 2017–2019 is largely responsible for the glum outlook for government revenue and low projected GDP growth rates.110 According to the Inter-national Monetary Fund and a number of prominent economists, Russia faces a growth ceiling; absent structural reforms, Russian GDP growth would probably reach only 1 to 2 percent per year, even were oil prices to increase significantly.111, 112

ince at least 1991, the Russian per-ception of the nature of modern con-flict has evolved. Russia views wars as

often undeclared, fought for relatively lim-ited political objectives, and occurring across all domains, including outer space and the information space.113 Russian leaders have noted the tendency for crises to arise quickly and develop impetuously, and to potentially escalate from local wars into global ones.114, 115

In addition, Moscow judges that modern con-flicts are characterized by a destructive and rapid “initial period of war”—a subject on which Russian military leaders and theorists have written extensively since the 1920s—which is becoming more decisive than ever before. In modern cyber-enabled informa-tion and battlefield spaces, this destructive non-kinetic initial period can be reduced to milliseconds, and kinetically to hours.116

Moscow fears that the speed, accuracy, and quantity of non-nuclear strategic preci-sion-guided weapons can achieve strategic effects on par with nuclear weapons,117 one of the primary reasons that since at least 1993 (and most recently codified in the 2014 Mili-tary Doctrine) Russia has reserved the right to a nuclear response to a non-nuclear attack that threatens the existence of the state.118, 119, 120 In addition to rejecting no-first-use, Moscow has discussed using nuclear weapons to de-escalate

a conflict.121, 122 While most military theorists and leaders believe great-power conflict is unlikely, they nevertheless express concern about the usability of the information space to achieve state goals.123 Russia has tied this deci-sive and shortened initial period to the idea that only more proactive or even preemptive action is required to counter it.124, 125, 126 Russian devel-opments in precision-guided munitions indicate a desire for “deep strike” capability to preempt attacks from an adversary.

Russia’s Military Doctrine, last updated in December 2014, contained several new ele-ments not in the 2010 Doctrine, which reflect Moscow’s military focus and threat per-ceptions. First codified in the doctrine was the concept of non-nuclear deterrence, an idea that has been evolving since the Soviet period. The doctrine also underscored per-ceived threats to Russia’s domestic security and described the military’s requirement to inflict unacceptable damage on any adversary at any time. This requires the military to cal-culate or understand what level of damage would constitute unacceptable damage to an adversary.127, 128, 129 Mobilization readiness of the state was stressed, as were measures to unify state, societal, and individual efforts to protect Russia and increase the effectiveness of military-patriotic indoctrination of citizens and their preparation for military service.130

Military Doctrine And StrategyRussian Perceptions of Modern Conflict

RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

The concepts of readiness, non-nuclear deter-rence, and unacceptable damage are closely linked in Russian thinking; Russian military leaders judge that a highly ready non-nuclear force, able to inflict unacceptable damage on an aggressor—including against its economy—at any moment, is its own deterrent.131, 132, 133, 134 For Moscow, the word translated as “deter-rence” ( ) is more closely linked to a concept of active restraint, or literally to hold back something moving with force.135 In the West, deterrence is often seen as an estab-lished condition, whereas in Moscow it is an active, flexible process that continues through-out the conflict spectrum.

The Russians define strategic deterrence as a package of coordinated political, diplomatic, economic, ideological, moral, spiritual, informa-tional, scientific, technological, military, and other actions taken by a country to demonstrate the decisiveness of the political leadership to tap all instruments of state power consecutively or simultaneously—to stabilize the military, political, and strategic environment, to antic-ipate aggression, and to deescalate military conflict.136, 137, 138, 139, 140 Some Russian theorists break deterrence down further into non-force-ful and forceful means and even into deterrence by “type” (economic, military, nuclear, non-nu-clear, etc.).141

Closely linked to strategic deterrence is the concept of strategic stability. At its basic level, Russia’s concept of deterrence, appropriately applied in its view, assures strategic stability. Strategic stability is the sum total of political, economic, military, and other measures (e.g.,

force) retained by states in a stable balance whereby neither side has the opportunity, inter-est, or intent to carry out military aggression.142

Russia has observed modern conflicts and incor-porated aspects of these observations into its deterrence and warfighting strategies. Russia seeks to shape the environment in peacetime to avoid or deter conflict and, if war does occur, will use its military force to establish a favor-able outcome for Moscow.143, 144 Moscow’s warf-ighting strategy includes use of indirect action and asymmetric responses, including using technical and psychological operations to dis-rupt technical systems, influence public opin-ion, and “erode the opponent’s resolve.”145, 146, 147 The modernization of its nuclear and conven-tional forces to include precision-guided strike weapons provide it a major military force to shape the outcome of war along the entire spec-trum of modern conflict.

Military and Security

Leadership

Decisionmaking in Russia is highly centralized, and President Vladimir Putin dominates Russia’s decisionmaking, including for military and secu-rity issues. His constitutional responsibilities include appointing the prime minister, chairman of the Central Bank, government ministers, and judges; he may announce State Duma elections or dissolve it. His annual address to the Federal Assembly sets guidelines for national internal and foreign policies, and he resolves internal governmental disputes. The Russian president

governs foreign policy, signs international trea-ties, forms and heads the Security Council, and approves military doctrine.148 The Russian pres-ident serves as the Supreme Commander in Chief of the Russian military, and in times of emergency he may introduce martial law.149

The Russian Ministry of Defense is subordinate to President Putin as Supreme Commander in Chief and is charged with implementing presi-dential policy within the military, overseeing all readiness, manpower, and procurement issues.150, 151, 152 The defense minister has the legal authority to oversee and direct opera-tions of the General Staff.153

Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu was appointed Defense Minister on 6 November 2012, after 18 years leading the Ministry of Emergency Situations.154 Shoygu’s introduction of fre-quent strategic-level, no-notice inspections in Russia’s military districts, unprecedented in number and scope for the post-Soviet Rus-sian military, has been critical in assessing and increasing combat readiness in the armed forces, as well in as refining defense reforms.155

The General Staff’s primary mission is to ensure the military security of the Russian Fed-eration (RF), that is, to protect the vital inter-ests of the state and society from internal and external threats. The General Staff is responsi-ble for monitoring and characterizing the threat environment and developing strategic and operational plans to equip, mobilize, employ, command, and control the armed forces.156, 157 According to a 2013 presidential edict describ-ing General Staff missions and functions, its range of responsibilities was broadened to include coordination of all activity undertaken by federal executive organizations to ensure defense capability and security.158

The chief of the General Staff, Gen-Army Valeriy Gerasimov, serves as the military head of the Russian Armed Forces.159 Gerasimov previously served as deputy chief of the General Staff from December 2010 until May 2012, when he was appointed commander of the Central Military District.160 He became chief of the General Staff in November 2012. He is a respected armor officer with substantial combat experience and time in command in Russia’s restive North

President Vladimir Putin Gen-Army Valeriy Gerasimov

Image Source: Open source

Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu

RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

Caucasus region.161, 162, 163 Since his appointment, Gerasimov has focused largely on dealing with military readiness, modifying defense reforms carried out by his predecessor, and preparing for security concerns.164, 165, 166, 167

Main Operations Directorate

The Main Operations Directorate (GOU) of the General Staff has operational control of the armed forces, organizes strategic and opera-tional force planning; executes military exer-cises and operational training, and engages with multilateral military-security organiza-tions such as the CSTO, CIS, and Shanghai Cooperation Organization.168 The GOU shapes the Defense Plan of the Russian Federation, identifies sources of threats to Russia for strate-gic planning, and works with the General Staff’s Military-Scientific Committee (VNK) to draft the State Armament Program.169, 170, 171, 172, 173

General Lieutenant (Gen-Lt, two stars) Sergey Rudskoy served as first deputy chief of the GOU for 9 years before becoming its chief in November 2015, Rudskoy has been the Gen-eral Staff’s senior representative at interna-tional forums, and he will likely leverage this experience to enhance coordination with other militaries operating in Syria.174, 175

National Military Command

and Control

At the pinnacle of Russian military command and control is the Russian president, Vladi-mir Putin, who serves as the Supreme Com-mander in Chief of the armed forces. As such, he is the primary decisionmaker and is autho-rized to assume direct command and control during times of crisis and martial law.176, 177 The minister of defense is appointed by the presi-dent and is charged with implementing presi-dential policy within the Ministry of Defense. This includes overseeing all hiring, equipping, training, care, and feeding of military person-nel. With the implementation of Russia’s New Look military reforms, the minister of defense now has legal authority to oversee and direct operations of the General Staff.178 The chief of the General Staff is also appointed by the pres-ident and serves as the military head of the armed forces.179 The General Staff’s primary mission is to ensure the military security of the Russian Federation and is responsible for mon-itoring and characterizing the threat environ-ment and developing strategic and operational plans to equip, mobilize, employ, command, and control the armed forces.180, 181 The service chiefs

Gen-Lt Sergey Rudskoy

Image Source: Open source

have the responsibility of organizing, training, and equipping their forces to meet current and future national security challenges.182

The Russian military has established a redun-dant and survivable command and control (C2) system to control its forces that serves as a force-enabler. Russia’s C4ISR complex uses multiple capabilities ranging from tech-nologically advanced systems to mechanically simple, legacy Soviet devices intended to cen-tralize control of the military while providing intelligence support to speed up decisionmaking cycles and carry out joint operations.183, 184

Russia’s C2 system has six key characteristics:

• Centralized. The president of the Rus-sian Federation is the commander in chief of the armed forces and is authorized to assume direct C2 over the military via the Ministry of Defense and General Staff during times of crisis and martial law.185

• Redundant. Multiple C2 systems are used at each echelon to disseminate commands and for the transmission of orders.186

• Geographically dispersed. Russia’s key C2 nodes and facilities are distributed throughout the country to increase surviv-ability and limit single points of failure.187

• Secure. Moscow is upgrading C2 systems to take advantage of modern and secure digital communications networks.188

• Reliable. Russia routinely conducts snap and other training exercises to test the sys-tems’ capabilities to pass information and increase decisionmaking efficiency.189

• Built for the worst case scenario. Rus-sian C2 systems are designed to enable the dissemination of launch orders while under nuclear attack through several C2 systems, including Perimetr, sometimes referred to as the “Dead Hand.”190

Russian Nuclear Command and Control

Maintaining control of its nuclear arsenal is of critical importance to Moscow. During the Cold War, Russia developed a centralized nuclear C2 system capable of meeting its three primary requirements: reliability, speed, and security.

President Putin with the nuclear briefcase.

Image Source: Russia Ministry of Defense/Creative Commons 4.0 Copyright

RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

To accomplish these goals, strategic planners designed a complex system-of-systems that pro-tects weapons from unauthorized or accidental use and centralizes command authority at the highest echelon, while guaranteeing the ability to quickly launch when necessary.191

Russian military doctrine underscores the cen-tral role of the Russian president in authorizing the use of nuclear weapons. He uses the nuclear briefcase, which is carried by officers who always remain near the president. The General Staff monitors the status of the weapons of the nuclear triad and will send the direct command to the launch crews following the president’s decision to use nuclear weapons. The Russians send this command over multiple C2 systems, which creates a redundant dissemination pro-cess to guarantee that they can launch their nuclear weapons. Moscow also maintains the Perimetr system, which is designed to ensure that a retaliatory launch can be ordered when Russia is under nuclear attack.192, 193, 194

Command and Control of

Joint Forces

Moscow Implemented a Joint Strategic Com-mand (OSK) structure in 2010 to better facilitate joint military operations. Russia converted its six military districts into four OSKs.197, 198 In 2015, Russia created a fifth OSK, the OSK Northern Fleet, to improve its capability to project military power into the Arctic and to take advantage of the opening of the Russia’s Northern Sea Route.199

In contrast to pre-reform military districts that were primarily land force commands, the new OSKs are joint force elements that have control in times of peace and war over all general purpose forces stationed in—or deployed to—their territories. The phrase “military district” still exists and refers to specific geographic boundaries, but an OSK is the command element for that area. For example, the Eastern Military District covers

President Putin and Defense Minister Shoygu at the NTsUO, November 2015.

Image Source: Russia Ministry of Defense/Creative Commons 4.0 Copyright

National Defense Management Center (NTsUO), November 2015.195, 196

Image Source: Russia Ministry of Defense/Creative Commons 4.0 Copyright

the geographic territory from eastern Siberia to the Pacific Ocean, but it is commanded by OSK East.200, 201 These reforms resulted in a reduced command structure, both vertically and horizontally, which is more streamlined, efficient, and flexible.202, 203

Moscow’s National Defense Management Center (NTsUO), which came online in 2014,

is a key component of the overall Russian C2 system. The NTsUO works with subordinate regional and territorial defense management centers to coordinate ministry and department activities among lower echelons in accordance with national defense and security directives while liaising with municipal authorities.204

RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

ussia is one of the oldest nuclear powers, first detonating a nuclear device in 1949.205 As heir to the former

Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal, Russia has one of the world's two largest inventories of strategic weapons. While participating in stra-tegic arms reduction treaties (START) with the United States, Russia is also committed to maintaining and modernizing its nuclear forces. Land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles are controlled by the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF), and the sea-based and air stra-

tegic systems are managed by the Navy and Aerospace force, respectively. Moscow plans to spend about $28 billion by 2020 to upgrade the capacity of its strategic nuclear triad.206

• In the first leg of the triad the SRF operates three older ICBM systems for more than half of their land-based nuclear delivery vehi-cles. The oldest ICBMs in the arsenal are the silo-based liquid-fueled SS-18 (deployed in 1988–92) and SS-19 (deployed in 1979-84). These missiles carry, respectively, 10 and 6 multiple independently-targeted

Dolgorukiy Class Nuclear Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine.

Core Russian Military CapabilitiesNuclear Forces and Weapons

Imag

e So

urce

: AFP

reentry vehicles (MIRVs). The solid-propel-lant, single-warhead SS-25 was deployed in 1985–92 as a road-mobile ICBM. As these aging missiles reach the end of their oper-ational lives, they will be withdrawn from service by 2019–2021 and replaced with newer, modern road-mobile and silo-based ICBMs by 2020. The SRF's missile invento-ries will be equally split between road-mo-bile and silo-based ICBMs.207

• The second element of the nuclear triad is a fleet of at least 10 nuclear-powered bal-listic missile submarines (SSBN) under administrative control of the Naval High Command. The Russian strategic Navy is modernizing, mainly by building and deploying the DOLGORUKIY-class SSBN platform for the new SS-N-32 BULAVA sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM).208

• The third element of the nuclear triad is the Russian Aerospace Force's fleet of strategic bombers, which forms the core of the Long-Range Aviation (LRA) Command. Like other components of the triad, the LRA is modernizing, to continue operating Tu-95

BEAR and Tu-160 BLACKJACK bombers beyond 2030. The last “new” BLACKJACK was added to the fleet in 2005, and all exist-ing Tu-160s will be upgraded to Tu-160M1 or M2. Russia has announced that it will resume production of Tu-160M2 bombers and complete development of a new genera-tion bomber (Russian designation: PAK-DA) within a decade, but timelines for both pro-grams may slip if financial difficulties arise. The new bomber design is expected to have some stealth and short- or rough-runway capabilities, and employ both conventional and nuclear armament.209, 210

The main function of strategic forces is effec-tive, reliable deterrence. Scenarios for the use of strategic nuclear forces fall into three main cat-egories: preemptive strike (first strike), coun-terstrike (launch on warning, prior to impact in-country), and retaliatory strike (response to impacts in-country). Because the retaliation option imposes the most difficult situation on the strategic forces—which must respond even

Russian Tu-160 heavy bomber and Il-78M tanker.

Image Source: AFP

Russian SS-27 Mod 2 road-mobile ICBM.

Image Source: AFP

RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

after an enemy's strategic strike has impacted and disabled elements of the force—strategic forces, weapons, and battle management sys-tems are designed and built to be hardened, stealthy, redundant, and reliable—and trained to function in a WMD-degraded environment.211

Russia continues to retain a sizable nuclear stockpile even after several decades of arms reduction treaties. Russia has a large nuclear weapons infrastructure and a production base capable of producing large numbers of new nuclear weapons annually.212, 213

The U.S.-Russia New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), signed on 8 April 2010, sets for each country a limit of 1,550 warheads on strategic platforms, including one warhead attributed to each heavy bomber. There is also a combined limit of 800 deployed and non-de-ployed ICBM and SLBM launchers and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, and a separate limit of 700 deployed strategic systems overall. The treaty will last 10 years, with cen-tral limits to be met by 2018 with the option for a single extension of another 5 years. Colonel Gen-eral Sergey Karakayev, commander of the SRF, has stated that an arsenal of 1,500 nuclear war-heads would provide Russia a sufficient deter-rent against attack.214 According to Russia’s New START Treaty data provided on 1 April 2017, Russia declared 1,765 warheads on 523 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers.215

Russia currently has an active stockpile of approximately 2,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons. These include air-to-surface mis-siles, short-range ballistic missiles, gravity

bombs, and depth charges for medium-range bombers, tactical bombers, and naval avia-tion, as well as anti-ship, anti-submarine, and anti-aircraft missiles, and torpedoes for sur-face ships and submarines. There may also be warheads remaining for surface-to-air and other aerospace defense missile systems.216, 217

Russia’s nuclear forces modernization goals include: replace Soviet-legacy systems with modern nuclear weapons, maintain rough parity with the U.S. nuclear arsenal, improve the survivability and efficiency of its nuclear weapons, and maintain prestige on the inter-national stage. Russia’s nuclear moderniza-tion includes both strategic and non-strate-gic nuclear weapons.218, 219, 220, 221

Biological and

Chemical Weapons

In 1992, then-Russian President Boris Yeltsin admitted having an offensive biological weap-ons program and publicly committed to its ter-mination. Subsequently, the Russian govern-ment reversed itself and now claims neither the Soviet Union nor Russia has ever pursued an offensive biological weapons program.222

In 1997, Moscow declared the world’s larg-est stockpile of chemical agents and muni-tions—40,000 metric tons of agents—under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The declared inventory consisted of a comprehensive array of traditional chemical warfare agents filled in munitions such as artillery, bombs, and missile warheads, as well as stored in bulk.223

As a state party to the CWC, Russia is obligated to destroy its chemical weapon stockpile.

As of January 2017, Russia had destroyed 96.4% of its declared chemical weapons stock-pile, according to press reporting.224 Russia intends to complete destruction of its remain-ing declared stockpile by 2020.225 Moscow has completed destruction activities and closed the facilities in Gornyy, Kambarka, Maradykovs-kiy, Leonidovka, Schchuch’ye, and Pochep and continues destruction of its remaining chemi-cal weapons stockpile at a facility in Kizner.226

Russia used chemical incapacitants to resolve the Dubrovka Theater hostage situation in 2002 and may consider using them in other counterterrorism actions.227

Anti-Access/Area Denial

Anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) refers to pre-venting an adversary from operating in a par-ticular region or area. Russia repeatedly cites in open source literature the need to repel or defend against a Western aerospace attack. Russia would seek to deter any Western use of aerospace power against Russia using its con-ventional, non-strategic nuclear, and, in extreme circ*mstances, its strategic nuclear forces. Rus-sian military theorists have examined the likeli-hood of a great power war arising out of a local conflict, similar to the events leading up to World War I, and escalating to combat with U.S./NATO or another peer.228 Based on insight gleaned from studies of warfare since 1991, Russia would seek to limit the capability of an adversary to conduct aerospace strikes on its territory.229, 230

Russian strategy for A2/AD would focus on a combination of various elements that military planners and theoreticians have identified as critical to the development of a comprehen-sive approach to A2/AD.231, 232 These involve the incorporation of the following elements.

Information Operations

Information operations are seen as a critical capability to achieve decisive results in the ini-tial period of conflict with a focus on control of the information spectrum in all dimensions of the modern battle space. Authors often cite the need in modern warfare to control informa-tion—sometimes termed “information block-ade” or “information dominance”—and to seize the initiative early and deny an adversary use of the information space in a campaign so as to set the conditions needed for “decisive success.” Russia continues to emphasize elec-tronic warfare and other information warfare capabilities, including denial and deception as part of its approach to all aspects of warfare including A2/AD.233

Strategic Air Operations

Russian military theorists continue to empha-size the key importance of strategic air opera-tions in modern war. This concept originated in the 1920s, where Soviet planners viewed the initial period of war as the time that avi-ation would strike deep in enemy rear areas to destroy mobilization and concentration areas. At the same time, air forces would also priori-tize the defense of the country against enemy air attack and conduct close air support of

RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

ground operations, achieving air supremacy in the first days of the war using all means.234 This concept was underscored in 1993, when Defense Minister Grachev indicated that “war will begin with an offensive aerospace operation on both sides.”235 Russian planners have indicated that in such a war there will be no front and no rear, with space emerging as an independent theater of military operations. Russian doctrine, down to the present day, continues to emphasize that strategic objectives can be achieved with mass aerospace strikes early in a conflict with victory achieved without the seizure and occupation of territory by forces.236

Russian planners have analyzed U.S. oper-ations such as DESERT STORM, NOBLE ANVIL, and IRAQI FREEDOM for insight, observing military art at the strategic, oper-ational, and tactical levels in campaigns that displayed U.S. aerospace capabilities and underscored the importance of developing comparable indigenous capabilities that can be employed defensively.237, 238 This empha-sis on strategic air operations is reflected in long-term procurement goals of platforms and weapons focused on space, aerospace defense, and precision-guided munitions.239, 240

Integrated Air Defense System

Russian doctrine places a great deal of empha-sis on aerospace defense as a key component in its overall A2/AD strategy.241, 242 Though still in development, Russia’s 21st century inte-grated air defense system will be designed to integrate future and existing systems around a central command structure that is designed

to promote the interaction of all air defense forces and weapons.243, 244 Capabilities opti-mized against cruise missiles are key to this defense component, not just those optimized to target aircraft.

Modern Precision Strike Capabilities:

Air and Sea Systems in Combination

with Older Technologies 245, 246

Russia continues to develop a variety of sea- and aerospace-based programs that offer a variety of offensive and defensive capabilities that could enable the implementation of its integrated A2/AD strategy.247, 248 These include the continued production and deployment of coastal defense cruise missiles, air/surface/sub-surface-launched anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs),249 submarine-launched torpedoes, and naval mines, along with Russian fighter, bomber, and surface-to-air missile capability.

Russian S-400 Surface-to-air missile systems – a key component of Moscow’s A2/AD strategy.

Image Source: AFP

These are intended provide Russia with the ability to limit access to its territory and extend its strategic depth by providing long range kinetic strike capability.

Precision Strike

Russian doctrine on Precision Strike is essentially a 21st century extension of the Russian doctrine of “deep battle” initially codified during the 1920s and 1930s by Chief of the General Staff Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevskiy and represents an attempt to incorporate new technology into traditional Russian strategic, operational, and tactical strategy. Deep battle was a strategic concept that focused on terminating, overwhelming, or dislocating enemy forces not only at the line of contact, but throughout the depth of the battlefield. Deep battle encompassed maneuvers by multiple Soviet Army front-size formations simultaneously. It was not meant to deliver a victory in a single oper-ation; instead, multiple operations, which might be conducted in parallel or succes-sively, would induce a catastrophic failure in the enemy's defensive system. Initially, deep battle focused on improved ground and air forces and was influential in Soviet oper-ations in World War II from 1943 onward. Chief of the General Staff Marshal Niko-lay Ogarkov, writing in the 1970s to 1980s, updated the deep battle concept to develop a more aerospace-centric approach in an attempt to incorporate traditional Russian doctrine with precision technology.250

Ogarkov theorized throughout his tenure as chief of the Soviet General Staff that conven-tional precision-guided munitions were part of a revolution in military affairs. In an influ-ential 1983 Krasnaya Zvezda article, Ogar-kov took notice of the impact of new types of precision weapons and micro-circuitry on the development of conventional capabilities. For Ogarkov, the development of new conventional forms of non-nuclear weapons would enable the sorts of multi-front operations that were envisioned in the original deep battle concept. On a theoretical basis, Ogarkov forecast that precision strike could exercise a direct and decisive outcome of a future war.251, 252

Despite enthusiasm by the Soviet General Staff, very little progress was made in the development of precision-guided munitions except at the theoretical level for the remain-der of the Soviet period. In 1991, DESERT STORM provided the Soviet military with proof of concept regarding the use of precision-guided munitions. Former Soviet officials and Russian authorities argued that the DESERT STORM campaign demonstrated the capability of preci-sion-guided airstrikes in the land attack role to paralyze the rear area and an adversary’s econ-omy. Targets could include vulnerable areas of the economy, command and control centers, and transportation centers. The introduction of precision-guided munitions changed the nature of modern war by reinforcing traditional con-cepts that emphasized decisive action during the initial stage of warfare and at the same time undermined the traditional Russian reli-ance on large ground force groupings to achieve tactical and strategic objectives.253

RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

Russia was unable to achieve real progress in the development of precision strike until the first decade of the 21st century, when it was able to create a viable state armaments pro-gram that allowed prioritization of certain key components of 21st-century warfare. Between 2010 and 2015, Russia’s strategic forces, space and aerospace defense platforms, and preci-sion-guided munitions254 such as ISKANDER, KALIBR, or KH-101 were defined as priori-ties, and system development, production, and testing occurred. The effectiveness of pre-cision-guided munitions are being tested in a variety of settings, including Command Staff exercises KAVKAZ-2012, VOSTOK-2014, and KAVKAZ-2016, as well as operationally against targets in Syria beginning in 2015.255, 256, 257

Space/Counterspace

The Russian General Staff postulates that modern warfare is increasingly reliant on infor-mation, particularly from space, because of the expansion of the geographic scope of military action and the information needs of high-pre-cision weapons.258 Russia has a significant constellation of satellites in orbit. According to Colonel Sergey Marchuk, chief of the Main Test Space Center, Russia has more than 130 spacecraft, civilian and military, performing communications, navigation, geodetic survey support, meteorological, reconnaissance, and intelligence gathering missions.259

Russia’s space program is both formidable and in a state of rebuilding. Moscow seeks to main-tain the health of its current constellations

while deploying a next-generation architecture on par with Western space systems. Over the next several years, Russia will prioritize the modernization of its existing communications, navigation, and earth observation systems, while continuing to rebuild its electronic intelli-gence and early warning system constellations.

Russia’s current systems provide an array of capability including high-resolution imagery, terrestrial and space weather, communica-tions, navigation, missile warning, electronic intelligence, and scientific observations. With a long-standing heritage in space, Russia gains a sense of national pride from its space pro-gram, which has included manned missions and leading the world in space launches. Cur-rently ranked third in total number of satel-lites in orbit behind the United States and China, the figure below displays a breakdown of Russia’s satellites in orbit.

Kh-101/102 air-launched cruise missiles on a Tu-95MS heavy bomber; Moscow first used its precision strike arsenal in combat during a series of 2015 strike opera-tions by sea- and air-launched cruise missiles against targets in Syria.

Image Source: Shutterstock

Russia has concluded that gaining and main-taining supremacy in space has a decisive impact on the outcome of future conflicts.261 According to Russia’s 2010 military doctrine, militarization of outer space is a “main exter-nal military danger.”262 The 2014 update to Russia’s military doctrine calls out Western global strike capability by name.263 Russia, in military journals, has observed that Western operations have shifted to non-contact opera-tions that rely on long-range, space-supported precision-guided munitions.264, 265, 266 Russia has been very vocal expressing its concerns about Western precision strike capabilities and mis-sile defense plans. Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin compared U.S. ballistic mis-sile defense efforts in Eastern Europe to the Strategic Defense Initiative of 1983 and stated

that such an effort justifies the development of Russian counterspace programs.

The Russian General Staff argues for pursuing in wartime such strategies as disrupting foreign military C2 or information support because they are so critical to the fast-paced, high-technology conflicts characteristic of modern warfare.267, 268 Russia believes that having the military capa-bilities to counter space operations will deter aggression by space-enabled adversaries and enable Russia to control escalation of conflict if deterrence fails.269 Military capabilities for space deterrence include strikes against satel-lites or ground-based infrastructure supporting space operations.270

On 1 August 2015, Russia created the Rus-sian Federation Aerospace Forces by merging

Russian satellites in orbit, 5 October 2016 260

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RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

the former Air Force and Aerospace Defense Troops. Defense Minister Shoygu stated the change was “prompted by a shift in the center of gravity… towards the aerospace sphere” and as a counter to the U.S. Prompt Global Strike doctrine.271, 272 This merged force includes Rus-sia’s space forces who have the mission of con-ducting space launches and maintaining the ballistic missile early warning system, the satellite control network, and the space object surveillance and identification network.273, 274, 275

Russia also reorganized its space industry responsible for space research, design, and pro-duction. Russia merged the government-owned United Rocket and Space Corporation (ORKK),

which previously absorbed the majority of the space industry corporations in 2013, with the Federal Space Agency.276, 277 President Putin finalized the dissolution of the Federal Space Agency on 1 January 2016, naming the joint organization the Roscosmos State Corporation.

Cyber

Russia views the information sphere as a key domain for modern military conflict.278, 279

Moscow perceives the information domain as strategically decisive and critically important to control its domestic populace and influence adversary states. Information warfare is a key

Russia’s planned space launches through 2019 280

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means of achieving its ambitions of becoming a dominant player on the world stage.281

Since at least 2010, the Russian military has prioritized the development of forces and means for what it terms “information confronta-tion,”282, 283 which is a holistic concept for ensur-ing information superiority, during peacetime and wartime.284 This concept includes control of the information content as well as the technical means for disseminating that content. Cyber operations are part of Russia’s attempts to con-trol the information environment.

The weaponization of information is a key aspect of Russia’s strategy and is employed in time of peace, crisis, and war. In practice, information battles draw upon psychologi-cal warfare tactics and techniques from the Soviet Era for influencing Western societies.285 Moscow views information and psychological

warfare as a measure to neutralize adversary actions in peace to prevent escalation to crisis or war.

Chief of the General Staff Gerasimov announced that “information operations troops” were involved for the first time in the Kavkaz-2016 strategic command staff exercise in Septem-ber 2016, demonstrating Russian military commitment to controlling the information domain.286, 287, 288

Propaganda Helps Shape The

Information Environment

Russian propaganda strives to influence, con-fuse, and demoralize its intended audience, often containing a mixture of true and false information to seem plausible and fit into the preexisting worldview of the intended audi-ence. Russian propaganda targets a wide variety

Information Confrontation

“Information confrontation,” or IPb (informatsionnoye protivoborstvo), is the Russian govern-ment’s term for conflict in the information sphere. IPb includes diplomatic, economic, mili-tary, political, cultural, social, and religious information arenas, and encompasses two mea-sures for influence: informational-technical effect and informational-psychological effect.289, 290

• Informational-technical effect is roughly analogous to computer network operations, including computer-network defense, attack, and exploitation.

• Informational-psychological effect refers to attempts to change people’s behavior or beliefs in favor of Russian governmental objectives.

IPb is designed to shape perceptions and manipulate the behavior of target audiences. Infor-mation countermeasures are activities taken in advance of an event that could be either offensive (such as activities to discredit the key communicator) or defensive (such as mea-sures to secure Internet websites) designed to prevent an attack.

RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

of audiences, including its own population, selected populations of other countries, domes-tic and foreign political elites, and the West writ large.291, 292 The variety of techniques for disseminating Russian propaganda include pro-Kremlin “news” websites and TV and radio channels such as Russia Today and Sputnik News, bots and trolls on social media, search engine optimization, and paid journalists in Western and other foreign media.

Cyber-Enabled

Psychological Operations

One of the newest tools in Russia’s information toolkit is the use of cyber-enabled psychological operations that support its strategic and tacti-cal information warfare objectives. These new techniques involve compromising networks for intelligence information that could be used to embarrass, discredit, or falsify information. Compromised material can then be leaked to the media at inopportune times.

• Hacktivists. Russian intelligence services have been known to co-opt or masquerade as other hacktivist groups. These groups

appeal to Russia due to the difficulty of attribution and the level of anonymity pro-vided. It is widely accepted that Russia, via patriotic hackers, conducted a cyber attack on Estonia in 2007.293 Under the guise of hacktivism, a group called “CyberCaliph-ate,” seemingly ISIS associated, conducted a hack against French station TV5 Monde in January 2015. The CyberCaliphate group was later linked to Russian military hackers. The same group hijacked the Twit-ter feed of the U.S. Central Command.294

• CyberBerkut – A False Persona. Rus-sian hackers also use false personas. CyberBerkut is a front organization for Russian state-sponsored cyber activity, supporting Russia’s military operations and strategic objectives in Ukraine.295 CyberBerkut employs a range of both technical and propaganda attacks, consistent with the Russian concept of “information confrontation.” Since emerging in March 2014, CyberBerkut has been implicated in multiple incidents of cyber espionage and attack, includ-ing distributed denial of service attacks against NATO, Ukraine, and German

Major themes of Russian propaganda include:

The West’s liberal world order is bankrupt and should be replaced by a Eurasian neo-conserva-tive post-liberal world order, which defends tradition, conservative values, and true liberty.296

The West demonizes Russia, which is only trying to defend its interests and sovereignty and act as an indispensable nation in world affairs.

The United States is determined to interfere with and overthrow sovereign governments around the world.297

government websites. More recently, it has focused on the online publication of hacked documents, ostensibly obtained from the Ukrainian government and political figures’ computers. CyberBer-kut uses information gained through these hacks to discredit the Ukrainian government. The intent is to demoral-ize, embarrass, and create distrust of elected officials.298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303

• Trolls. Russia employs a troll army of paid online commentators who manipulate or try to change the narrative of a given story in Russia’s favor. Russia’s Troll Army, also known as the Internet Research Agency, is a state-funded organization that blogs and tweets on behalf of the Kremlin.304 Trolls typically post pro-Kremlin content and facilitate heated discussions in the com-ments sections of news articles. Their goal is to counter negative media and “Western influence.” While the goal of some trolls is to simply disrupt negative content, other trolls promote completely false content.305

• Bots. Another way Russia manipulates the information space is through the use of bots. Bots are automated pushers of content on

social media. These bots vary in sophistica-tion and can continuously push content or imitate real life patterns. Bots can drown out unwanted content or push a specific message. Bots have the ability to overwhelm the information space and discourage read-ers from looking for real content.306, 307

Information Defense

The Russian Federation Security Council’s 2016 Information Security Doctrine mandates protecting Russian citizens from outside threats to the information sphere. The doctrine aims to secure Russian information freedom and pro-tect information technologies from foreign influ-ence, cyberattacks, intelligence collection, and terrorism. The doctrine emphasizes the need to develop a national system for government con-trol of the Russian Internet, information war-fare forces, and cyber weapons.308

Since at least 1999, Russia has attempted to gain consensus on international governance of the Internet and international norms and rules

X&sU-! @#Tg^ e$4*!

Russia uses a Troll Army to disseminate and over-whelm blogs and twitter communications.

Image Source: DIA, D3 Design

CyberBerkut Arm Patch.

Image Source: Russia Ministry of Defense/Creative Commons 4.0 Copyright

RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

guiding the behavior of states in the information space. A major component of the proposal pertains to a state’s ability to govern its information space as a means of maintaining state sovereignty and preventing an arms race in cyberspace. Although state sovereignty traditionally refers to domes-tic enforcement law, Russia commonly uses this term to denounce other nations meddling in their internal affairs. Russia also proposed a code of conduct for cyberspace with specific dictums regarding non-state cyber-actors, such as crimi-nal hackers involved in cyber activities.309, 310

Media Laws –

A Hedge Against Instability

In the past decade, Russia has implemented numerous laws curbing domestic media in broad-cast, print, and cyber media, taking an abrupt turn from the post-Soviet glasnost policies of media “openness” and its own constitutional guar-antees of freedom of speech.311 The use of social media to organize opposition street protests in

2011 and 2012 prompted a reappraisal of official internet policy. Since then, the authorities have treated the Internet as a serious threat, pushing through laws increasing government controls over technology and content giving the state pow-ers to block content, ban websites, monitor online activity, and limit media ownership.312 The ulti-mate goal of this policy appears to be to create what some have called a "sovereign internet.”313

The Kremlin's strategy of reducing foreign influ-ence on the media has not been confined to the internet. Numerous other pieces of legislation have been passed restricting the level of foreign ownership of the media, impeding the work of the foreign NGOs supporting independent media in Russia and forcing Russian media to account for any foreign funding they receive. A recent law has even banned foreign companies from conducting TV audience research in Russia.314

Indirect Action

Indirect action is a component of Russia’s stra-tegic deterrence policy developed by Moscow in recent years. Its primary aim is to achieve Rus-sia’s national objectives through a combina-tion of military and non-military means while avoiding escalation into a full blown, direct, state-to-state conflict.315 Drawing on a combi-nation of facets from Russia’s whole-of-govern-ment or interdepartmental strategy and overt or covert military means, indirect action seeks to exploit weaknesses and fissures in target countries in order to fulfill Moscow’s desired national goals.316

The Internet Research Agency in St. Petersburg.

Image Source: Russia Ministry of Defense/Creative Commons 4.0 Copyright

In Ukraine, indirect action manifested itself in non-military measures first, with less visi-ble efforts taken to exert pressure on Kiev, like restricting food imports to Russia, but then broadening to wider actions involving financial, economic, and information warfare. Later, this was followed by unconventional military action involving Russian Spetsnaz and other non-at-tributable military units in Crimea and east-ern Ukraine.317 This phase involved the actual seizure of facilities and infrastructure by these covered units, along with the use of local agents, sympathizers, and irregular forces in the vicin-ity to cause unrest and subversion, all of which are distinct hallmarks or evolutions of Soviet-era Spetsnaz wartime operations.318

Electronic Warfare

Based on authoritative military academic writ-ings, the Russian military views electronic warfare as an essential tool for gaining and maintaining information superiority over its adversaries. Russia’s world-class electronic war-fare forces support denial and deception opera-tions and allow identification, interception, dis-ruption, and, in combination with traditional fires, destruction of adversary command, control, communications, and intelligence capabilities.

In addition to technical disruption, effective use of electronic warfare can confuse adversary com-manders and decisionmaking at any or all levels, demoralize opposing troops, and allow Russian forces to seize the operational initiative.319, 320, 321 Russia has fielded a wide range of ground-based

electronic warfare systems to counter GPS, tac-tical communications, satellite communications, and radars.322 Further, military academics have suggested that electronic warfare fuse with cyber operations, allowing electronic warfare forces to corrupt and disable computers and networked systems as well as disrupt use of the electro-magnetic spectrum.323, 324 Russia has aspirations to develop and field a full spectrum of electronic warfare capabilities to counter Western C4ISR and weapons guidance systems.

Power Projection

Moscow continues to prioritize modernizing its military forces, viewing military power as crit-ical to achieving key strategic objectives and global influence. Russian acquisition plans for its ground, air, naval, and missile forces are designed to enable the ability to conduct out of area operations during peacetime and to contest

Russian jammer on display at Kubinka in 2016; Mos-cow has invested heavily in developing sophisticated electronic warfare capabilities.

Image Source: Shutterstock

RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

U.S./NATO military superiority in the event of a regional conflict. The rebuilt Russian mili-tary includes modernized, agile general pur-pose forces, vital to limited out-of-area power projection. While the objectives of the Russian military do not suggest a return to the Cold War posture, Moscow intends to use its military to promote stability on its own terms and to assert its great power status.

Russia’s State Armaments Program will con-tinue to emphasize priority programs related to the development of a viable 21st-century mili-tary, prioritizing strategic forces, space, preci-sion-guided munitions, and aerospace defense capabilities. Russia’s strategic triad along with the increasing capability of its conventional forces remains a critical deterrent in preventing an attack. Russian long-range aviation remains a priority for Russian leadership as a key part of its strategic deterrent capability, while also pro-viding an advanced conventional option to rap-idly project power well beyond Russian borders. Russia is also modernizing its naval forces, which conduct operations globally in order to “show the flag” and contribute to Moscow’s narrative of Russia’s re-emergence as a global power. Russia is also focused on enhancing its C4ISR capabil-ities, which will enable improved targeting and timely responses to perceived threats.

• Long-Range Aviation: Russia periodically deploys assets of its LRA bomber force to con-duct limited out-of-area operations as a power projection tool. LRA operations have included activity in the Pacific, the Arctic, and even as far south in 2008 as Venezuela. The capabil-ities of LRA aircraft allow for missions as far as 5,000–10,000 kilometers away.325

• Naval Forces: The Russian Navy will continue to conduct operations in parts of the world that are deemed important to national objectives. In recent times, these have included operations in the Mediterra-nean,326 the Arctic,327 and periodic deploy-ments to the western hemisphere328 and the Indian Ocean.329 Russia’s naval recapi-talization program will focus on the devel-opment of modern general purpose sub-marines and surface combatants to enable continued out-of-area operations.330, 331

• Expeditionary Operations: Along with more conventional power projection mis-sions, Russia has displayed a new capa-bility to field an expeditionary force capa-ble of intervening in a foreign conflict. In Syria, Russia used a mix of maritime and air assets to forward deploy its forces, and Russia will almost certainly be able to logistically support its current level of operations in Syria via a mix of those means for the foreseeable future.332

After politically supporting the Syrian regime throughout the Syrian civil war, Moscow began to deploy military forces to Syria in September 2015, likely both to shore up the regime and assert Russia’s status as a military player and powerbroker in the Middle East.333 The majority of Russian air strikes and artillery operations have supported regime ground offensives and focused on opposition targets, with an increased focus against Islamic State forces at certain points in their campaign.334, 335, 336

Russia has also sought to use the Syrian interven-tion as a showcase for its military modernization program and advanced conventional weapons systems, including employing systems from out-

side of Syrian territory to demonstrate its power projection capacity. Moscow has launched Kalibr land-attack cruise missiles from naval units in the Caspian Sea and the Mediterranean Sea, demonstrated new capabilities with air-launched cruise missiles from its Tu-160M1 BLACKJACK and Tu-95MS BEAR H heavy bombers, for-ward-staged long-range Tu-22M3 BACKFIRE bombers for strikes from Iranian territory, and deployed some of its most advanced air and air defense systems to Syria.337, 338, 339, 340 These oper-ations are meant to demonstrate strategic capa-bilities and message the West about the manner in which the Russian military could operate in a major conventional conflict, while also providing combat experience for the personnel and allow-ing the systems to be field tested.341, 342

Underground Facilities

Russia inherited a vast underground facilities (UGFs) program from the Soviet Union, primarily designed to ensure the survival of the leadership and military command and control in wartime. This program involved the construction of under-ground bunkers, tunnels, secret subway lines, and other facilities beneath Moscow, other major Russian cities, and the sites of major military commands. Although the majority of these hard-ened facilities are near-surface bunkers, many critical sites are built deep underground and, in some cases, are hundreds of meters deep.343

Deep underground command posts both within and outside of Moscow are interconnected by a network of special deep subway lines that pro-vide leadership a quick and secure means of evacuation. The leadership can move from their peacetime offices through concealed entryways to protective quarters beneath the city. A deep underground facility at the Kremlin and an enor-mous underground leadership bunker adjacent to Moscow State University are intended for the National Command Authority in wartime. They are estimated to be 200–300 meters deep and can accommodate an estimated 10,000 people.344

The leadership can remain beneath Moscow or travel along the special subway lines that con-nect these urban facilities to their preferred deep underground command posts outside the city, and possibly to the VIP terminal at Vnu-kovo Airfield, 27 kilometers southwest of the Kremlin. Two of the most important under-ground complexes for the National Command

A Russian naval task force centered on its only air-craft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, conducted a 5-month deployment to the Mediterranean to support strike operations in Syria.

Image Source: AFP

RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

Authority and General Staff are located some 60 kilometers south of the city.345

The support infrastructure for the UGFs in and around Moscow is substantial. A highly redundant communications system, consisting of both on-site and remote elements, allows the leadership to send orders and receive reports. Highly effective life support systems may per-mit independent operations for many months following a nuclear attack.346

Russian military officials suggest the UGF pro-gram has been retained. In October 2014, chief of the General Staff’s Main Operations Direc-torate, General-Lieutenant Andrey Kartapolov, told a Rossiyskaya Gazeta correspondent that the new National Defense Management Cen-ter in Moscow is safe from a nuclear strike. The National Defense Management Center became operational in December 2014 and is at the apex of the national command structure. General Kartapolov noted that protection against nuclear strike is always considered in building the most important facilities.347

Denial and Deception

The Russian military relies on extensive use of denial and deception (maskirovka) to obscure intentions and conceal military movement. The family of capabilities that composed traditional maskirovka includes camouflage, deception, denial, subversion, sabotage, espionage, propa-ganda, and psychological operations.

Russian operational and tactical maskirovka is a form of operational combat support. It encom-passes a set of interrelated organizational and

technical measures and practical actions of staffs, troops, and facilities intended to deceive foreign intelligence. Maskirovka promotes surprise, maintenance of combat capability, and surviv-ability. For example, maskirovka in rocket units and subunits is organized and carried out for the purpose of ensuring that the enemy experiences maximum difficulty in collecting intelligence data to reduce the effectiveness of strikes, but is also carried out to create the false appearance of a combined unit in support of deception at the operational level of war.348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353

Moscow employed maskirovka at the beginning of the 2014 conflict in Ukraine, when media reported on the presence of “little green men” in Crimea who strongly resembled Russian soldiers although they wore uniforms without insignia identifying their origins. President Putin insisted they were “self-defense groups” or “volunteers.” By the time Moscow admitted to the presence of Russian troops in Crimea, this deception had created enough confusion to forestall significant international intervention in the conflict, and the ground reality was irre-versibly tipped in Russia’s favor.354, 355, 356, 357, 358

Moscow used troops without insignia – the “little green men” – to seize the Crimean Peninsula in early 2014, claiming these forces were local militia.

Image Source: Shutterstock

Outlook: A Modernizing Force he Russian military has built on the mil-itary doctrine, structure, and capabilities of the former Soviet Union, and although

still dependent on many of the older Soviet plat-forms, the Russians have modernized their mili-tary strategy, doctrine, and tactics to include use of asymmetric weapons like cyber and indirect action such as was observed in Ukraine.

One of Russia’s biggest hurdles since the dis-solution of the former Soviet Union has been its need to rely heavily on its nuclear forces to deter aggression, resulting in its stated willing-ness for first-use of nuclear weapons.359, 360 Russia has been building its conventional force capabil-ity along with modernizing its nuclear forces to create a more balanced military. Moscow has stressed development of conventional preci-sion-strike weapons, a critical gap in its inven-tory, and recently has tested them in combat in Syria, providing it with an advanced non-nuclear capability to impact the battlefield.

In 2009, after almost two decades of deteriora-tion and neglect of the Russian military, Moscow began developing a more modern military force capable of power projection outside Russia’s bor-ders. The New Look reforms instituted struc-tural and organizational reforms and the State Armaments Program emphasized development of modernized platforms and weapons’ systems. In 2013, readiness became an additional area of emphasis with institution of no-notice “snap” exercises and accompanying mobilization and deployments. Moscow’s long-term goal is build-

ing a military prepared to conduct the range of conflicts from local war through regional conflict to a strategic conflict that could result in massive nuclear exchange.

Recently, Russian forces have been involved in conflict in Ukraine and conducted an expedi-tionary deployment to Syria, providing experi-ence in combat operations, and employing new tactics and advanced weapons systems. This more flexible and modern Russian force did not spring up overnight but is a result of years of concentrated effort to develop and field an improved military force.

Russia’s desire to be a leader in a multipolar world and recapture the “great power” sta-tus it had in Tsarist times and the latter days of the Soviet Union requires a force capable of deterring aggression, fighting the range of con-flicts from local crises to nuclear war, projecting power and employing force if necessary to inter-vene in conflicts across the globe. Despite an economic slowdown that will affect the Russian military’s timeline for building all of its planned capabilities, Russia is rapidly fielding a modern force that can challenge adversaries and support its “great power” aspirations.

Russia’s commitment to building its military is demonstrated by its retention of the draft. All Russian males are required to register for the draft at 17 years of age and all men between the ages of 18 and 27 are obligated by law to perform one year of military service.

RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

The Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) (Russian name: Raketniye Voyska Strategicheskovo Naz-nacheniya [RVSN]), is one of the most potent mis-sile forces in the world.361, 362 The SRF was estab-lished as a separate military service in December 1959 to operate the first nuclear-armed intercon-tinental-range land-based ballistic missile (SS-6), as the third element of Russia's growing strate-gic nuclear force deterrent triad.363, 364

The Russian SRF headquarters is in Moscow. The SRF's three missile armies—the 27th, 31st, and 33rd—have a total of 12 subordinate missile divisions. Eight of the divisions operate road-mobile ICBMs, with the other four armed with silo-based missiles.365, 366 The Russian SRF have approximately 60,000 personnel.367

In 2016, the SRF had deployed 299 operational missiles, with half that number equipped with

Appendix A: Russian Strategic Rocket Forces

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Locations of Strategic Rocket Forces missile divisions.368, 369, 370

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multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) payloads. The SRF arsenal includes three older ICBM types—46 SS-18s and 30 SS-19s in silos, and 72 road-mobile SS-25s—and two newer ICBM types—60 silo-based and 18 road-mobile SS-27 Mod 1s, and 73 of the most modernized SS-27 Mod 2s.371, 372

The development of new ballistic missile systems is a high priority for Russia. The Russian mili-tary has outlined that the SRF should be com-pletely re-armed with modern (post-Soviet) mis-sile systems by 2022.373 Russia has stated that it will soon begin testing a developmental, heavy, liquid-propellant ICBM called the Sarmat to replace the aging SS-18. Russia’s goal is to begin Sarmat deployment in the 2018–2020 timeframe.

Russia has announced a new missile called the Rubezh (Border) or RS-26, which is smaller than the SS-27 Mod 2 ICBM and will be deployed in 2017.374 According to the SRF commander, the RS-26 is envisioned as a mobile system and has been referred to by Russian Vice-Premier Rogozin as a “missile defense killer.”375 Russian industry officials also claim development of the Barguzin rail-mobile ICBM is continuing. A decision on full development, production, and deployment will occur in the coming months.376

The currently deployed SS-18, which Russia plans to replace with the Sarmat, is a silo-based, 10-MIRV heavy ICBM first deployed in 1988; it needs to be replaced by 2018–2020, when the SS-18s' 27- to 30-year service lives expire.377 The SS-19 is a silo-based, six-MIRV ICBM that entered service in 1980, which the

SRF will replace with silo-based SS-27 Mod 2 by 2019, as the SS-19s retire.378

The SS-25 solid-propellant, single-warhead, road-mobile ICBM was first deployed in 1985 and will retire by 2019–2021, to be replaced by regi-ments of new production SS-27 Mod 2s, and possi-bly the two-stage, road-mobile RS-26 Rubezh.379, 380

In addition, Russian leadership claims a new class of hypersonic glide vehicle is being developed to allow Russian strategic missiles to penetrate missile defense systems. Hyper-sonic glide vehicles (HGVs) are maneuver-able vehicles that travel at hypersonic (typi-cally greater than Mach 5) speed and spend most of their flight at much lower altitudes than a typical ballistic missile. The combina-tion of high speed, maneuverability, and rel-atively low altitude makes them challenging targets for missile defense systems.381

Russia’s overall number of strategic systems is constrained by the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which entered into force on 5 February 2011. This treaty limits the United States and Russia to no more than 1,550 deployed warheads each (including warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs, and counting each heavy bomber as one war-head) 7 years after entry into force.382

Russia retains about 1,200 nuclear warheads for ICBMs. Most of these missiles are maintained on alert, capable of being launched within min-utes of receiving a launch order. Although the number of missiles in the Russian ICBM force

RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

will continue to decrease because of arms con-trol agreements, aging missiles, and resource constraints, Russia intends to retain the largest ICBM force outside the United States.383

Despite Russia’s modernization efforts, the size of the SRF may drop below 300 deployed ICBMs by the early 2020s, but most of those

missiles will be equipped with multiple war-heads. The composition of the force is chang-ing significantly to meet the deployed strategic warhead total limit of 1,550. Notably, prior to 2010, no SRF road-mobile ICBMs carried MIRVs; by the early 2020s, all will do so.384

Russian ICBM Systems385

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SystemNumber of Stages Warheads Propellant

Deployment Mode Max Range km

SS-18 MOD 5

2 + PBV 10 LIQUID SILO 10,000+

SS-19 MOD 3

2 +PBV 6 LIQUID SILO 9,000+

SS-25 3 + PBV 1 SOLID ROAD-MOBILE 11,000

SS-27 MOD 1

3 + PBV 1 SOLIDSILO and ROAD-MOBILE

11,000

SS-27 MOD 2

3 + PBV Multiple SOLIDSILO and ROAD-MOBILE

11,000

APPENDIX B: Russian Ground Forces

Russian Ground Forces

The Russian ground forces are composed of the Ground Troops, Airborne Troops (VDV), Naval Infantry, Coastal Troops, Coastal Missile Artil-lery Troops, and National Guard. The Russian Federation armed forces are geographically dis-tributed across four military districts: Western, Southern, Central and Eastern. The Western Military District has three numbered com-bined-arms armies (CAAs), the Southern and Central Military Districts each have two, and the Eastern Military District has four.

The Ground Troops

The Ground Troops, or Sukhoputniye Voyska, are the land warfighting component of the Rus-sian Ministry of Defense. The Ground Troops constitute the largest component of the Russian Federation armed forces. The Ground Troops are currently organized into approximately 40 active and reserve maneuver brigades and eight maneuver divisions.386 There are about 350,000 military personnel in the ground troops.387

According to Russia's Ministry of Defense, the roles of its Ground Troops include repelling enemy aggression and the protection of Rus-sia's territorial integrity and Russian national interests.388 Its main peacetime missions include maintaining adequate combat readiness, partici-pating in international peacekeeping operations, participating in disaster recovery efforts, and assisting in the maintenance of internal security,

if needed. Examples of what Moscow designates peacekeeping operations include ongoing efforts in breakaway enclaves in Georgia and Moldova.389

In times of heightened tension, the Ground Troops will mobilize forces, operationally deploy to threatened areas, call up and train reservists, and prepare for defensive operations. Finally, in a time of war, Russia's Ground Troops are charged to suppress military conflicts if possible, repulse enemy aggression, conduct defensive and counter-offensive operations to defeat the aggressor, and defend critical infrastructure.390

Organizationally, the Ground Troops are com-posed of main combat components—motorized rifle, tank, missile and artillery, and air defense units. Support elements for these units include

Russian armored fighting vehicles parade in Red Square; ground forces have historically played a dom-inant role in Russian military issues and leadership.

Image Source: AFP

RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

reconnaissance, engineer, nuclear, biological and chemical defense, and signal troops.

• Motorized Rifle Troops units are the most abundant formations in Russia's Ground Troops. Essentially mounted infan-try, these are highly mobile forces tasked with holding territory, repulsing enemy attacks, breaking through enemy defenses, capturing important areas, and defeating the enemy.391

• Tank Troops are the main strike compo-nent of the Ground Troops. They support Motorized Rifle Troop missions with direct fires during meeting engagements.392

• Missile Troops and Artillery are the main means of indirect fires for Russian combined arms operations. Missile Troops and Artillery forces are organized into mis-sile, rocket-artillery, and combined artillery units.393 Missile units operate close/short-range ballistic missiles. Rocket-artillery units operate multiple rocket launchers (MLRs), and combined artillery units oper-ate composite towed or self-propelled artil-lery and MLRs.

• Air Defense Troops provide air defense for the Ground Troops. These units are equipped with anti-aircraft missiles, anti-aircraft artil-lery, anti-aircraft gun-and-missile systems, and portable anti-aircraft missile systems.394

• Reconnaissance Troops perform a wide range of tasks in order to provide decision makers with information about enemy strength, disposition, terrain, and weather conditions.395

• Engineer Troops perform a variety of specialized tasks, including the construc-tion of fortifications, installation of obsta-

cles (mine fields, etc.), the preparation of field deployment locations, the preparation and maintenance of deployment routes, the construction of bridges and ferry cross-ings, and water purification.396

• Nuclear Biological Chemical Defense Troops are specialized forces tasked with mitigating the effects of nuclear, biological, or chemical contamination.397

• Signal Troops are specialized forces designed for the deployment and mainte-nance of mobile redundant command, con-trol, and communications systems.398

The New Look Reforms and

the Ground Troops

The centerpiece of the 2008–2009 New Look reforms was the elimination of the divisional/regimental structure and its replacement by the brigade. The Russian Ground Troops currently have about 40 combined arms brigades.399 In the winter of 2013, one motorized rifle brigade and one tank brigade were reformed as divisions, and in the spring of 2016, it was announced that four new divisions would be formed in the Western and Southern Military Districts and one in the Central Military District.400

The transition to the brigade structure was intended to optimize Russia's ground forces to fight in what the Russians call "local wars and armed conflicts," limited wars along Rus-sia's periphery, which the Russian General Staff believes to be very likely under modern conditions. In November 2011, then-Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Makarov said: "The possibility of local armed conflicts virtually

along the entire perimeter of the border has grown dramatically."401 The Russian ground forces fielded brigades of this type that had been field tested in Afghanistan (1979–1989) and had proved to be quite effective in combat.402

Another development that had received great impetus in the Afghanistan war was the rein-forced battalion, or battalion tactical group (BTG), a motorized rifle or tank battalion, strengthened by other assets, such as artillery, reconnaissance, and air defense resources. BTGs are similar to NATO battalion task forces and are ad-hoc organizations, individually created and optimized to fulfill a particular mission.403

The new Russian divisions are much smaller than their Soviet predecessors. While a Soviet motorized rifle division numbered around 13,000 officers and soldiers, Russia's new motorized rifle divisions number around 9,000.

A proponent of the mixed division-brigade ground forces, then-acting chief of the ground forces, General Lieutenant Vladimir Popov, stated that Russia's combined arms brigades “in terms of structure are intended for fighting in local wars," but that they also "can be successfully employed in large-scale wars. They differ from divisions by lesser numbers of personnel and military equip-ment and are capable of executing missions with the very same high effectiveness as divisions, but in a smaller zone of responsibility."404 The re-introduction of some smaller divisions may be based more on their potential intimidation value than they are on their potential value in combat.

These positive developments have led some analysts to claim that Russia is developing entirely new military concepts. Modern Rus-

sian tactics show a strong continuity with past practices. Recent Russian activity in eastern Ukraine, for example, demonstrates a creative use of their traditional combined arms and reconnaissance-strike tactics combined with a more aggressive application of information warfare concepts that date back to the Soviet period. Russian ground forces troops have coop-erated with non-traditional semi-military forces such as partisans and Cossacks for centuries.405 Regardless, the contemporary Russian ground forces pose a serious challenge to U.S. military planners, and they should be seen as neither a simple continuation of past Soviet practices, nor an entirely new force employing entirely new military concepts, but a highly nuanced and adaptive combination of both.406

The main combat power of the Ground Troops is centered in tank and motorized rifle divisions and separate tank and motorized rifle brigades that are normally subordinate to combined arms armies. Although Russia's military strategy is officially defensive, the Russian Ground Troops basic principle of land warfare is violent, sus-tained, and deep offensive action, just as it was during the Soviet era. Mechanized and armored formations supported by aviation and artillery are to seize the initiative at the outset of hostil-ities, penetrate the enemy's defenses, and drive deeply and decisively into the enemy's rear area.

Combined Arms Armies

The combined arms army is an operational and administrative organization that forms the basis of the Russian field army. A typical combined arms army includes two to four com-bined arms brigades, usually motorized rifle

RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

brigades and in a few cases a tank brigade, plus artillery, missile, air defense, engineer, chem-ical defense, communications, intelligence and reconnaissance, and rear support units. By altering the mix of motorized rifle and tank formations and artillery and missile support, the army can operate in either offensive or defensive roles in different geographical areas and under various operational constraints.

The Tank Army

The Russian armed forces currently only have one tank army, the First Guards Tank Army (1st GTA). It, like the combined arms army, is both an operational and administrative

unit. Currently, the 1st GTA includes a tank division, a motorized rifle division, and a tank brigade, plus artillery, missile, air defense, engineer, chemical defense, communications, intelligence and reconnaissance, and rear support units. The traditional role of a tank army is to exploit penetrations deep into the enemy's rear areas.

The Separate

Combined-Arms Brigade

The primary combat formation of the Ground Troops is the separate combined-arms brigade, either motorized rifle (MR) or tank. There are three basic tables of organization and equip-

New Look Motorized Rifle Brigade Table of Organization and Equipment: Primary and Supporting Subunits407

1612-11131

Bde Cdr Headquarters

MR BN x3

51043 MT-LBV

8 2S12

Tank BN

41 T-72

Officers327

NCOs1,005

Enlisted3,061

Civilians128

TOTAL4,521

SP Arty BN x2

18 2S19

MRL BN

18 BM-21

Signal BN

223

227CBT Engr BN

246Recon BN Material Support BN

193 280Repair BN

81CBR Defense Company

102Electronic Warfare Company

48Commandant Company

60Medical Company

13016 2S6M1

6 SA13

AD MSL Arty BNAT Arty BN

12 MT-1224 9P162

AD MSL BN

12 SA-15B TLAR9x SA-18 MANPADS

ment (TO&Es) for separate MR brigades and one for separate tank brigades. All Russian combined-arms brigades, however, regardless of specific primary combat vehicle, are orga-nized in essentially the same manner.408

Tank and MR brigades differ in organization in that where the MR brigade has three MR battalions, one tank battalion, and an anti-tank (AT) battalion, the independent tank bri-gade reverses this basic structure with three tank battalions, one motorized tank battalion, and no AT battalion.409 The three MR TO&Es differ from one another in their primary com-bat vehicle, either wheeled armored person-nel carrier (APC) or tracked infantry fighting

vehicle (IFV).410 The organizational structure of a typical tracked APC-equipped indepen-dent MR brigade is shown in the accompa-nying illustration.411 In addition, the primary equipment of a separate motorized rifle bri-gade is shown in the table below.

Battalion Tactical Groups

BTGs are task-organized battalion-plus-sized tac-tical combat entities that are capable of perform-ing independent combined-arms combat mis-sions. They are similar in purpose, structure, and tactical use to U.S. Army battalion task forces. Most, if not all, New Look maneuver brigades

Russian Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade Personnel and Primary Offensive Equipment412

1612-11142

Nomenclature Quantity

Personnel 4521

T-72B3 Main Battle Tank 41

BMP-3 Infantry Fighting Vehicle or 129

BMP-2 Infantry Fighting Vehicle or 129

MT-LBV Tracked Armored Personnel Carrier 129

BTR-82A Wheeled Armored Personnel Carrier 129

2S19 152-MM SP Howitzer 18

BM-21 Multiple Rocket Launcher 18

RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

have one BTG, manned entirely or mostly with contract soldiers, that is used to perform the most difficult or complicated combat tasks assigned to the brigade. An order issued on 19 September 2012 required all maneuver brigade commanders to create a contract-manned BTG within the bri-gade if they had not already done so.413

The need to have effective BTGs is a primary driver of the New Look structural reforms. BTGs have their theoretical origins in the late Soviet period, where they were envisioned to fight against NATO on both a nuclear or non-nuclear battlefield in a nonlinear, large-scale environ-ment. BTGs have been used in every local war or armed conflict in which Soviet and Russian forces have been involved since the Afghanistan War (1979–1989).414 The tactical use of BTGs in combat has impacted the tactical principles that govern their construction and use. BTGs currently serve—and will continue to serve—as Russia's primary tactical fighting unit in all tactical circ*mstances, both in large-scale and small-scale conflicts, well into the future.

The Airborne Troops

Russia's Airborne Troops, or VDV (Vozdush-no-Desantniye Voyska), is an independent arm of service within the Russian Federation armed forces. It is composed of four maneuver divi-sions, four maneuver brigades, and a separate special purpose (Spetsnaz) reconnaissance bri-gade.415 The VDV serves as Russia's high-mo-bility initial invasion and rapid response force.416, 417 In its role as rapid response or initial assault forces, the VDV may be used to achieve specific objectives that shape the battlespace for

follow-on ground forces. These may include:

• Seizing key terrain (i.e., bridges, airports, and seaports)

• Establishing blocking positions and verti-cal envelopment of a retreating enemy

• Disrupting enemy logistical supplies, com-munications, and command centers

• Destroying high value targets418

Maneuver formations within the VDV are des-ignated as either parachute or air assault, the primary difference being in whether they arrive at their objective via airdrop or overland means. In all cases, VDV personnel are trained to oper-ate both ways. Major VDV formations are:

• Two parachute divisions – the 98th Guards and 106th Guards

• Two air assault divisions – the 7th Guards Mountain and 76th Guards

• Four air assault brigades – the 11th, 31st, 56th, and 83rd

• One special-purpose reconnaissance bri-gade – the 45th Spetsnaz419

In line with its highly mobile function, the VDV is equipped with a large number of amphibious air droppable combat vehicles, the BMD-se-ries IFVs and BTR-D series APCs. The VDV's increased mobility comes at the expense of armor and firepower; its primary combat vehi-cles are generally lighter than their Ground Troops counterparts. In late 2016, however, the air assault divisions and brigades received up to a company (10 to 13) of T-72-series main bat-tle tanks. The tank companies within these air assault units will very likely increase to tank

Russian VDV Primary Combat Vehicles1612-11144

System FunctionCapacity (Crew/Dismounts)

BMD-2 Infantry Fighting Vehicle 2/5

BMD-4M Infantry Fighting Vehicle 3/5

BTR-D Tracked APC 3/10

BTR-MDM Tracked APC 3/10

2S9 120-mm SP Combination Gun 3

2S25 125-mm Tracked SP Antitank Gun 3

battalions (30 to 42) by the end of 2018.420, 421

The MBTs are not intended for air drops, but will accompany VDV ground maneuver forma-tions to increase firepower and lethality.

Naval Infantry

Russian Naval Infantry is organized into units that are operationally subordinate to fleet commanders. Naval Infantry is focused on amphibious assaults, coastal defense, counterterrorism, anti-piracy, and ship secu-rity missions. The organization and equip-ment of Naval Infantry units are generally similar to that of motorized rifle units in the Ground Troops.422

The Naval Infantry consist of four indepen-dent brigades, one separate brigade, and three separate battalions.423

Coastal Troops

The Russian Coastal Troops consist of Coastal Missile Artillery Forces (CMAF) and Coastal Troops. CMAF consist of three independent brigades, two independent regiments, and one independent battalion.

The Coastal Troops are organized as ground forces but are subordinate to the Navy. The Coastal Troops consist mainly of motor-ized rifle brigades and artillery brigades. Their primary mission is coastal and regional defense.424 The Navy Ground and Coastal Troop Headquarters, a command unit based in Moscow, heads the Coastal Troop force, but coastal missile units likely take operational orders from their respective fleets.425, 426, 427

Russia’s coastal missile and artillery forces provide anti-ship defenses for Russia’s coast-

RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

line and littoral regions. Coastal missile defense in Russia is primarily centered on anti-ship missile systems. Most units are still dependent on two systems that entered pro-duction in the late 1970s to early 1980s—the

STYX and SEPAL. Efforts are underway to rearm the coastal missile force with new, lon-ger-range missile systems.428 These systems include the BAL and BASTION, and they are slowly being introduced to the force.429

BASTION Coastal Defense Missile Launcher.

Image Source: AFP

APPENDIX C: Russian Aerospace Forces

The former Russian Federation Air Forces and Aerospace Defense Troops merged to create the Russian Federation Aerospace Forces (VKS) in August 2015. The merger places former space and aerospace defense assets vital to strategic aerospace operations under one organizational structure.430, 431 The Russian Aerospace Forces include four tactical air armies, which are aligned with the military districts. They also contain the

Long-Range Aviation (LRA) and Military Trans-port Aviation (VTA), as well as the Space Troops, which are not subordinate to the military dis-tricts but to Aerospace Command in Moscow.432 Overall manpower for the Russian Aerospace Forces is listed at 148,000 including conscripts.

The 6th Air Force and Air Defense Army (AFADA) is subordinate to the Western Military

Russian Air Forces Air Bases433

1612-11135

Moscow maintains aviation units in Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, represented on the map by the two fighter base symbols outside Russia’s borders.

Image Source: DIA, D3 Design

RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

District, the 14th Air Force and Air Defense Army to the Central Military District, the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army to the Eastern Military District, and the 4th Air Force and Air Defense Army to the Southern Military District.

Long Range Aviation: The LRA is the bomber force of the Russian Aerospace Forces and operationally subordinate to the Supreme High Command of the Russian armed forces. The LRA is tasked with long-range bombard-ment of strategic targets with conventional

or nuclear weapons. Currently, TU-95MS aircraft are being modernized to include the Kh-101/102 missile system.434 The LRA has an inventory of 16 Tu-160, 60 Tu-95MS, and more than 50 Tu-22M3 bombers.435

Military Transport Aviation: The VTA is subordinate operationally to the Supreme High Command of the Russian armed forces and is the main provider of the air lift for Russian troops and equipment. The recent Ukraine and Syria conflicts have resulted in heavy

Russian Air Forces Order-of-Battle436

1612-11136

Aircraft Type Total Number Most Capable

Bomber 141 Tu-160

Fighter 420 MiG-29

Fighter Ground Attack 345 Su-35S

Attack 215 Su-25SM

ELINT 32 Il-22M

Airborne Warning and Control 22 A-50

C2 6 Il-86VKP

Tanker 15 Il-78M

Heavy Transport 122 An-124

Training 198 Yak-130

use of the VTA forces, allowing pilots to gain significant flight hours. The primary aircraft operated by the VTA include the Il-76, An-124, An-22, An-26, An-72, and An-12. The various sizes of aircraft allow the VTA to support many different missions from VIP flights, to small cargo, to transporting tanks and aircraft. Addi-tionally, these aircraft tend to have larger fuel tanks allowing for extended missions without refueling to increase efficiency.437

Space Troops:438 These forces within the Aerospace Forces have the mission of conduct-ing space launches and maintaining the ballis-tic missile early warning system, the satellite control network, and the space object surveil-lance and identification network.439, 440, 441

RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

Russian Combat Aircraft – Fighters 442, 443, 444, 445, 446

1612-11138

Fighter Aircraft Entered Service Role

Operational

Su-35S 2014 Multi-Role Fighter

Su-30SM 2014 Multi-Role Fighter

Su-34 2012 Multi-Role Fighter-Bomber

MiG-31BM 2012 Fighter Interceptor

Su-27SM3 2011 Multi-Role Fighter

MiG-29K/KUB 2009 Multi-Role Naval Fighter

Yak-130 2009 Light Attack Fighter-Trainer

MiG-29N/SE 2009 Multi-Role Fighter

MiG-29SMT 2006 Multi-Role Fighter

MiG-29UBT 2006 Multi-Role Fighter

Su-27SM 2006 Fighter Interceptor

Su-30M2/MK2 2003 Multi-Role Fighter

Su-33 1994 Naval Multi-Role Fighter

Su-27P/S 1986 Fighter Interceptor

Su-27UB 1990 Fighter Interceptor

MiG-29 1983 Multi-Role Fighter

MiG-31 1981 Fighter Interceptor

Developmental

MiG-29M/M2 2018 Multi-Role Fighter

MiG-35S 2018 Multi-Role Fighter

PAK-FA 2020 5th Generation Multi-Role Fighter

LMFS Circa 2030 Light Weight Multi-Role Fighter

PAK-DP Circa 2030 Multi-Role Fighter Interceptor

Russian Bombers 447, 448, 449, 450, 451

1612-11107

Bomber Aircraft Entered Service Role

Tu-95MSM BEAR 2015 Modified Strategic/Tactical Bomber

Tu-160M BLACKJACK 2014 Modified Strategic/Tactical Bomber

Tu-22M3M BACKFIRE 2014 Modified Regional Bomber

Tu-160 1987 Legacy Strategic Bomber

Tu-95MS 1983 Legacy Strategic Bomber

Tu-22M3 1981 Legacy Regional Bomber

Developmental

Tu-160M2 2020 New Build Strategic/Tactical Bomber

PAK-DA 2025+ Future Strategic/Tactical Bomber

Integrated Air Defense System

Russia employs what is considered to be among the very best of modern military integrated air defense systems. Historically, Russia has been a leader in developing technologically advanced detection and engagement elements. During the 1990s, Russia largely maintained its research

and development programs for air defense equip-ment.452 During this period, Russia purchased very few of these systems for domestic use.453 However, the State Armaments Program of 2015, and the subsequent 2020 plan, significantly enhanced support for the purchase and employ-ment of the newest and most capable air defense equipment including radar, surface to air mis-

RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

siles, command and control, and electronic war-fare equipment. Concurrent to the acquisition plan, Russia continues to support research and development efforts in the air defense realm.454

The military integrated air defense system kill chain provides the framework for the Russian design, deployment, and command hierarchy of deployed air defense assets. The kill chain con-

tains the seven elements that a fully functional Russian military integrated air defense system would employ in an air defense scenario.

To support the kill chain (outlined below), Russia employs redundant and overlapping systems.455

Russia employs its military integrated air defense system at home and abroad. The military inte-

Russian Military Integrated Air Defense System Kill Chain1612-11110

Kill Chain Element Associated Equipment/Process

Indications and warning

Human intelligence, signals intelligence, open-source information, over-the-horizon radar

DetectionAir surveillance radar, airborne early warning and control radar, passive Detection system, ship-based radar, visual observation, secondary surveillance radar

IdentificationSecondary surveillance radar, visual identification, non-conformity with approved routes

TrackingIntegration of detection data into data processing and command & control elements to maintain positional data on an airborne threat

AssignmentCommand & control (variable echelon, based on threat condition and other factors) takes track data and assigns target tracks to weapons platforms

EngagementSurface to Air Missiles, Air to Air Missiles, Air Defense Artillery, Electronic Warfare

Assessment

Verification of engagement: air surveillance radar, airborne early warning and control radar, passive detection system, ship-based radar, visual observer, secondary surveillance radar in conjunction with command & control elements

grated air defense system also plays a significant role in Russia’s domestic defense and expedition-ary operations.456 Russia’s initial deployments to Crimea and Syria included the Pantsir and S-300 air defense systems. These systems allowed Rus-sia to build an echelon-based air defense system in the Crimean Peninsula.457 At a later point in the Crimean and Syrian operations, Russia

deployed long-range strategic surface to air mis-sile systems in both countries.458

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

In 2008, Russia lagged behind the world in devel-opment of UAVs. However, the 2008 Georgia conflict accelerated efforts with initial require-

Russian Unmanned Aerial Vehicles459, 460

1612-11113

UAV Entered Service Role

Operational

Pchela-1K 2009 Tactical UAV

Zala 421-08

Grusha / Granat-12010 Tactical UAV

Zastava 2013 Tactical UAV

Orlan-10 2013 Tactical UAV

Forpost 2013 Tactical & Strategic UAV

Rubezh-20 / Granat-4 2013 Tactical UAV

Takhion 2014 Tactical UAV

Developmental

Orion/Inokhodets 2018 Tactical & Strategic UAV

Altius-M 2019 Strategic UAV

Gonshchik 2020+ Tactical & Strategic UAV

Okhotnik-B/U 2025+ Medium Weight UCAV

RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

ments focused on tactical reconnaissance sys-tems that currently dominate inventory. Russia has introduced a class of mini-UAVs for use by the military, but the most significant defense developments are occurring with larger, more capable systems for tactical and strategic use. Russia is also working on unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs).461

Russia’s fleet of aircraft is aging, but they are rapidly modernizing their air force as well as their air defense systems. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Russia’s air force entered a decline as industry and operational units languished. Since 2008, however, the Rus-sian Air Force and Navy have invested unprec-edented financial resources toward airpower to include the upgrade and/or new build of approx-

imately 700 combat fighter/bomber aircraft through 2020 to replace legacy systems.462, 463, 464

Newly modified aerodynamic systems in Syria demonstrate that Russian airpower has returned in limited numbers. Similar efforts with newly upgraded air combat sys-tems have been used in the Crimea/Black Sea and Baltic regions with Russian expectations that provocative moves by the United States and/or NATO will be met with more capable Russian air power. Finally, a slowly improved strategic bomber force (i.e., Tu-95MS BEAR and Tu-160 BLACKJACK) is again using Cold War concepts to conduct international flights that impinge upon the sovereign bor-ders of foreign nations.465

APPENDIX D: Russian Navy

The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, as well as the economic stagnation that followed, led to a severe downsizing for the Navy. Naval construction ground to a halt, and the fleet fell into disrepair and obsolescence.466 Under Vlad-imir Putin, however, the Russian military’s capabilities have undergone significant improve-ment, and the Navy is no exception.

The Russian Navy has approximately 130,000 personnel.467 The combined major forces of the current Russian Navy number about one-sixth to one-quarter of what was the Soviet Navy in its heyday. That legacy force today has an average age exceeding 20–25 years. With the economic stabilization of the Rus-sian Federation in the early 2000s, the past

10 years have seen a steady increase in the maintenance, training, and deployment activ-ity of the Navy and, more importantly, the activation of a broad submarine and ship con-struction program to recapitalize the fleet. The Navy’s missions remain focused on stra-tegic deterrence and homeland defense. Peri-odic distant deployments support the Russian Federation’s global foreign policy interests.

The Navy operates nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, which are an essential arm of Russia’s nuclear triad and capable of delivering nuclear warheads from thousands of kilometers away. This strategic capability puts the Russian Navy in the top tier of for-eign navies.468

Russian Navy Organization1612-11111

Russian Navy

Northern Fleet Joint Strategic

Command (OSK)

Northern

FleetPacific Fleet Baltic Fleet

Black Sea

Fleet

Caspian

Flotilla

Eastern Military

District/(OSK)

Western Military

District/(OSK)

Southern Military

District/(OSK)

Southern Military

District/(OSK)

RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

Structure

The headquarters of the Russian Navy is located in St. Petersburg. The Russian Fed-eration Navy consists of four fleets (Baltic, Black Sea, Northern, and Pacific) and a flotilla in the Caspian Sea. The fleets receive admin-istrative orders and guidance from the Navy Staff in St. Petersburg, whereas operational orders are issued from the various Joint Stra-tegic Commands (OSKs).469 Each fleet and the Caspian Flotilla is operationally subordinate to one of these OSKs.

Northern Fleet

The Northern Fleet is Russia’s most capable naval force. Based in Severomorsk, located in the Kola Gulf (the only ice-free direct access to the North Atlantic), its seven operational ballistic missile submarines provide the bulk of the firepower for the Navy’s arm of the stra-

tegic nuclear triad.470 Russia’s only operational aircraft carrier is also based in the Northern Fleet, along with the Navy’s only nuclear-pow-ered heavy cruiser.471 Surface combatants and submarines deploy worldwide from the Kola Gulf, playing an active role in the ongoing Syria crisis, conducting counter-piracy patrols off the Horn of Africa, along with power projec-tion in the North Atlantic and Caribbean. The Northern Fleet’s two primary missions are to provide strategic deterrence with its ballistic missile submarines and to defend the mari-time approaches to northwest Russia.472

Pacific Fleet

The Pacific Fleet lags behind the Northern Fleet in terms of maintenance and overall capa-bility; however, it is still able to conduct strate-gic nuclear strikes against the U.S. mainland, and its surface units are active from the Pacific region to the Horn of Africa.473 The Pacific Fleet has its headquarters in Vladivostok, but its forces are split between two main locations with the majority of surface ships and diesel powered submarines in the Vladivostok region and the nuclear powered submarines, including the SSBNs, located in Petropavlovsk-Kamchats-kiy.474, 475 The workhorses of the PACFLT are four UDALOY-class destroyers, which are regu-larly deployed throughout the region.476

Black Sea Fleet

The Black Sea Fleet for years has been a fleet in decline, forced to operate with a handful of Sovi-et-era vessels. Beginning in 2014 after the occu-

GRIGOROVICH frigate.

Image Source: AFP

pation of Crimea, new units began to enter the order of battle including modern coastal missiles and naval infantry.477 Then in 2015, new subma-rines and surface combatants began to arrive to bolster the fleet. Now armed with the KALIBR missile system, the Black Sea Fleet is a signif-icant force in the region and over the next few years could have as many as six new attack sub-marines and six new surface ships, which can not only exert control on the Black Sea, but can operate in the Mediterranean to counter NATO forces and support operations in Syria.478

Baltic Fleet

The majority of Baltic Fleet vessels are located at Baltiysk in the Kaliningrad Oblast with a handful further north near St. Petersburg.479 Headquar-tered at Kaliningrad, the fleet’s mission focuses on specifically ensuring sea-lines of communica-tion and trade are open between Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg, and in countering NATO forces in the region.480, 481 The Baltic Fleet has also been a key player in support of Russian interests in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea and Horn of Africa.482 With the arrival of two KALIBR-equipped ves-sels in 2016, the Baltic fleet presents a significant long-range precision conventional and theater nuclear strike threat to Western Europe.

Caspian Sea Flotilla

The Caspian Sea Flotilla is the dominant naval force on the Caspian Sea and was the first Rus-sian surface force operationally equipped with the KALIBR missile system. Russia’s naval superiority ensures Moscow has leverage in

regional economic disputes. The KALIBR land attack cruise missile gives Moscow a preci-sion strike weapon that can range targets in Central Asia, the Middle East, and parts of Europe, as evidenced by strikes into Syria in October 2015.483 Most of the flotilla’s combat power (all of the KALIBR shooters) are based at Makhachkala, possibly to be closer to regional threats and also to avoid having to navigate the Volga River Delta to reach the sea, as is the case with ships based at Astrakhan.484, 485

Naval Aviation

Naval aviation assets are spread through four fleet air forces, each with composite reg-iments under their command. The main mis-sions of naval aviation are to track and destroy enemy submarines and warships and also help achieve air superiority where the fleet is oper-ating.486 Most naval aviation aircraft are land-based; the only aircraft carrier, ADMIRAL KUZNETSOV, can accommodate 22 strike air-craft and 17 attack helicopters.487

Submarine Forces

Russia’s sea-based strategic deterrent is deployed in the Northern and Pacific Fleets. There are six DELTA IV SSBNs, one DOLGORUKIY SSBN, and one remaining TYPHOON SSBN used as a test platform in the north. Three DELTA III and two DOLGORUKIY SSBNs are in the Pacific. All sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) carried by these submarines—SS-N-18 (DELTA III), SS-N-23 (DELTA IV), and SS-N-32 (DOLGORU-KIY)—can reach U.S. targets from their home-

RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

base piers and, if required, could be launched with the submarines on the surface.

These SSBNs are protected by nuclear-pow-ered cruise missile and torpedo attack subma-rines, which also engage enemy surface and submarine forces and pose a land attack cruise missile threat against an enemy homeland. In the Northern Fleet, these attack submarines include three OSCAR II and one SEVEROD-VINSK SSGNs and three VICTOR III, six AKULA I/II, and four SIERRA SSNs. The SEVERODVINSK class is new, extremely quiet and is armed with a wide range of advanced cruise missiles to destroy enemy ships and tar-gets ashore. The Pacific Fleet has five OSCAR II SSGNs and four AKULA I SSNs. It will even-tually receive SEVERODVINSK SSGNs. A new fifth-generation general purpose nuclear-pow-ered submarine is under development.

Non-nuclear diesel-electric submarines round out the Russian submarine forces. These units are assigned to all fleets for close-in area defense mis-sions in adjacent seas. Older and newer versions of the KILO class comprise most of this force: six in the Northern Fleet, two in the Baltic, three new KALIBR-equipped units in the Black Sea, and eight older KILO class in the Pacific. The new-est KILO version continues in construction with three more units destined for the Black Sea Fleet and eventually another six for the Pacific Fleet. A single PETERSBURG-class improved design experimental unit is in the Northern Fleet with two additional units to be completed. A future non-nuclear, KALINA design, likely having an air independent propulsion plant, is in develop-ment with construction projected after 2020.

Surface Forces

The Russian Navy’s major combatant surface ships, frigates and larger, comprise some 32 units assigned across all 4 fleets.

• The Northern Fleet has Russia’s only air-craft carrier (KUZNETSOV), one nucle-ar-powered KIROV-class cruiser, one con-ventionally powered SLAVA-class cruiser, and four UDALOY-class destroyers. The first new GORSHKOV-class (KALIBR) guided missile frigate was recently commis-sioned with more expected. This fleet also has 12 minor anti-ship and anti-subma-rine combatant ships, as well as 4 ROPU-CHA-class amphibious assault ships.

• The Baltic Fleet has nine major ships—two older SOVREMENNYY-class destroyers and seven frigates: one KRIVAK-class, two NEUSTRASHIMYY-class, and four new STEREGUSHCHIY-class units. It recently received two SVIYAZHSK-class (KALIBR) guided missile patrol ships. These are sup-plemented by 18 minor combatants and 4 amphibious assault ships.

• The Black Sea Fleet has one SLAVA-class cruiser, one 47-year-old KASHIN-class destroyer, two older KRIVAK-class frig-ates, and the first of a planned six new GRIGOROVICH-class (KALIBR) frigates. More new construction units are expected for the Black Sea Fleet. The fleet is sup-plemented by 15 minor combatants and 7 amphibious assault ships.

• The Caspian Flotilla has two GEPARD-class frigates (one with KALIBR) and recently received two new ASTRAKHAN-class patrol ships and three SVIYAZHSK-class (KALI-BR-capable) guided missile patrol ships.

• Finally, the Pacific Fleet has seven major ships: one SLAVA-class cruiser, four UDALOY-class and two SOVREMENNYY-class destroy-ers. These are supplemented by 24 minor anti-ship and anti-submarine combatants and 4 amphibious assault ships.

The Russian Navy has several weapons upgrade programs in progress. The new SS-N-32 BULAVA submarine launched ballistic missile is being produced for the DOLGORUKIY-class SSBNs. The most consequential development is that Russia plans to deploy KALIBR capabil-ity on all new design construction nuclear and non-nuclear submarines, corvettes, frigates, and larger surface ships. KALIBR provides even modest platforms, such as corvettes, with sig-nificant offensive capability and, with the use of land attack missiles, all platforms have a signif-icant ability to hold distant fixed ground targets at risk using conventional warheads. The prolif-

eration of this capability within the new Russian Navy is profoundly changing its ability to deter, threaten, or destroy adversary targets.

Although the Navy is mainly made up of Sovi-et-era surface ships and submarines, an exten-sive modernization program is underway, focusing first on the submarine force.488, 489, 490 Progress in submarine modernization is under-way; however, the majority of the naval inven-tory still consists of aging units from the 1980s and 1990s. While more new classes of ships are planned, the Navy will have to maintain its older fleet for several years until these new vessels come online. Despite this, Russia is still capable of deploying its assets worldwide, best evidenced by continuous support to Rus-sian operations in Syria since 2012 and recur-ring counter-piracy deployments to the Gulf of Aden since 2008.491, 492

RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

APPENDIX E: Russian Special Operations Forces

Russia’s special operations forces are popu-larly known by the abbreviation “Spetsnaz,” short for Spetsial’noye naznacheniye, a term meaning “special purpose.” Spetsnaz, although similar to special operations forces in Western countries, retains a slightly differ-ent set of roles and missions than those com-monly found elsewhere. The current incarna-tion of Spetsnaz traces its origin back to naval and ground units created back in the mid-1950s to establish a dedicated special pur-pose force to operate with the armed forces, although its wider lineage can be attributed to counterrevolutionary and partisan units formed during the Russian Revolution and World War II, respectively.493

These predecessor units became pivotal in defining the hallmark missions of the mod-ern Spetsnaz force, from diversionary acts conducted by partisan units behind German lines in World War II to deep reconnaissance and intelligence collection, reflecting the post-war perception of a potential conflict with the West during the Cold War.494 These tra-

ditional missions—with slight modifications and variations—still manifest themselves in Spetsnaz doctrine and are associated with Moscow’s recent strategy of using indirect action, albeit with the wider aim of achieving goals while avoiding a large-scale conflict.

Within Russia, the term Spetsnaz is often misappropriated and misattributed. Moscow’s true Spetsnaz force is a relatively small, select group of mission-dedicated special purpose forces, primarily belonging to the military and its Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) (e.g., the Defense Ministry’s ground and naval Spetsnaz units), and to a lesser extent, the security services of the National Guard, Fed-eral Security Service (FSB), Foreign Intelli-gence Service (SVR), and Justice and Emer-gency Situations Ministries.495 Estimated to number 20,000–30,000 personnel, Spetsnaz units in these organizations all retain distinct and separate missions from one another. The single largest contingent with which recent and visible exploits of Spetsnaz are attributed reside with the GRU.

APPENDIX F: Russian Intelligence Services

Russia has three primary intelligence ser-vices: the Federal Security Service (FSB), the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), and the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU). The FSB and SVR trace their lineage to the old Soviet Committee of State Security (KGB). Although the FSB and SVR are considered military services under Rus-sian federal law, they are more akin to civil-ian intelligence agencies.496

The Federal Security Service

The FSB has three primary missions: counter-ing foreign intelligence services, combatting organized crime, and ensuring economic and financial security. It is also the Russian lead counterterrorism organization.497 President Vladimir Putin launched a major reorganiza-tion of the FSB during his first term, placing the organization under the president’s direct control. The FSB has continued to grow, inte-grating the Border Guard Service of Russia and the Federal Agency of Government Com-munication and Information (FAPSI).

The Foreign Intelligence Service

The SVR is Russia’s main external intelligence agency; it focuses on civilian affairs, whereas the GRU focuses on military affairs. According to Russian law, the SVR is authorized to carry out the following missions:498

• Conduct intelligence.

• Implement active measures (disinformation, propaganda, etc.) to ensure Russia's security.

• Conduct military, strategic, economic, scientific, and technological espionage.

• Protect employees of Russian institutions overseas and their families.

• Provide personal security for Russian government officials and their families.

• Conduct joint operations with foreign security services.

• Conduct electronic surveillance in foreign countries.

RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

Responsibilities of Russian Intelligence Services499, 500, 501, 502

1612-11140

Political Intelligence

Economic Intelligence

Military Intelligence

Measures of Support

Counter- Intelligence

Political Security

Law Enforcement

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The GRU is the Ministry of Defense’s for-eign intelligence organization that provides military intelligence for the General Staff, Ministry of Defense, and senior government officials.505, 506, 507, 508 The GRU’s responsibilities include providing senior political and mili-tary leadership with all-source intelligence, including indications and warning of stra-tegic threats and information to assist leader-ship in making decisions regarding Russia’s armaments program.509, 510 GRU operations abroad involve human intelligence (HUMINT)

collection on potential enemies’ military- industrial capabilities, troop movements, and weapon systems.511, 512 The GRU manages mil-itary attachés, intelligence analysis, cryptanal-ysis, space-based assets, telecommunications intercept capabilities, and radio-electronic and telecommunications-based offensive capa-bilities.513, 514 It also oversees Spetsnaz units and special operations forces.515, 516, 517, 518 GRU operational combat and advisory roles have expanded dramatically in the past decade, involving military operations in Ukraine’s Crimea region, eastern Ukraine, and Syria. 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526

GRU Headquarters Moscow.503, 504

Image Source: Russia Ministry of Defense/Creative Commons 4.0 Copyright

RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

APPENDIX G: Defense Industry and Modernization Programs

Russia’s huge defense industrial complex focuses predominantly on weapons production, though the goal is to move toward a combina-tion of military and non-military products.527 President Vladimir Putin and Deputy Premier Dmitriy Rogozin, whose government portfolio covers the defense industry, have said that high levels of spending on the military and defense industrial complex will benefit the entire economy.528, 529 In April 2016, Putin announced Russia’s arms sales from the last year had been higher than planned, totaling $14.5 billion, with additional orders for $56 billion, the high-est since 1992.530, 531 However, while Moscow’s pursuit of arms trade deals abroad may help partially offset challenging financial conditions and support continued military modernization goals, significant problems remain.

Challenges, partly due to Western sanctions, have slowed production for some weapons and equipment. Russian industry’s dependence on weapons production, the depreciation of the ruble, and growing interest rates on industrial loans, which are used to finance facility modern-ization and production expenses, have increased business costs for Russian defense firms.532

Russian economists have warned that the resulting imbalance between civilian and mili-tary spending could be problematic.533, 534, 535, 536

Russia’s 2011–2020 State Armaments Pro-gram reflects President Putin’s ambitious mandate that 70% of Russia’s weapons inven-tory consist of new or upgraded equipment by 2020.537, 538 In pursuit of that goal, Putin person-ally makes decisions about the defense indus-try’s weapons modernization, production, and financing. Putin reestablished the Military Industrial Commission (VPK) in 2007 to bet-ter manage state control of defense production and acquisition.539, 540

Since May 2013, Putin has chaired week-long working groups with the Defense Ministry and defense industry leadership twice a year to monitor program implementation and oversee adjustments.541, 542, 543 By 2014, Putin decreed himself Chairman of the VPK, probably to ensure that defense modernization efforts were fulfilled within economic constraints.544, 545 At the same time, Defense Minister Shoygu set up a half dozen new Defense Ministry scien-tific and technical organizations, headed by military scientists, to place priority on defense orders that were cutting-edge, Russian-made, and technologically feasible.546, 547

The following are examples of weapons sys-tems in active production, testing, or assimila-tion into military use, indicating current Rus-sian leadership priorities for defense industry.

Ballistic Missile Sector

A key area of development detailed in Russia’s 2011–2020 State Armament Program are the ballistic missile forces, which form the back-bone of Moscow’s nuclear triad.548, 549 Russia has three competent bureaus that specialize in the design and development of ballistic missiles.550 Russia’s modernization efforts are driven by an aging missile inventory, the need to maintain a credible launch capability, and concern with the deployment of anti-missile defense systems by the United States.551 As of 2015, modernized systems only made up 56% of the missile force; they are scheduled to reach 100% by 2022.552

Intercontinental Ballistic

Missiles (ICBM)

Russia has several legacy ICBMs in its active inventory, including the SS-18, SS-19, and SS-25 that are being replaced by the SS-27, Sar-mat, and SS-27 Mod 2; replacements should be completed by 2022.553, 554, 555

The SS-27 is a solid-propellant ICBM (silo and mobile variants), which uses a delivery vehi-cle made by the Minsk Heavy Wheeled Vehi-cle Factory in Belarus with launch equipment added by TsKb Titan in Volgograd. The SS-27 missile was designed by several institutes: the

Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology for the overall design, NPO Soyuz in Lubertsy for the three solid rocket motors, the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics in Sarov for the nuclear warhead, and GPO Votkinskiy Mekhanicheskiy Zavod in Votkinsk for final assembly.556, 557, 558

The Sarmat heavy ICBM is still in testing with the State Missile Center Makeyev and is sched-uled to complete development around 2018.559 The missile will be manufactured by the Kras-noyarsk Machine Building Plant, while the NPO Energomash-designed motor will be pro-duced by Proton-PM based in Perm.560

A new solid-propellant ICBM, the RS-26 (Rubezh), was developed as a lighter version of the SS-27 and will only be deployed as a mobile variant sometime in 2017.561 The missile’s lower weight increases mobility and survivability, and the RS-26 will make use of various countermea-sures to penetrate anti-missile defense systems.562

SS-27 Mod 2 ICBM.

Image Source: Shutterstock

RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

In addition, Russian officials claim a new class of hypersonic vehicle is being developed to allow Russian strategic missiles to penetrate missile defense systems. Hypersonic glide vehicles are maneuverable vehicles that travel at hypersonic (typically greater than Mach 5) speed and spend most of their flight at much lower altitudes than a typical ballistic missile. Press reporting claimed a successful test of this system from an SS-19 booster occurred in April 2016.563

Submarine-Launched

Ballistic Missiles (SLBM)

The SS-N-18 SLBM, first deployed in 1978, is a two-stage liquid-propellant system designed to be launched from a DELTA III submarine. The latest version, the SS-N-18 Mod 3, can carry up to three warheads to a maximum range of over 5,500 kilometers.564

The SS-N-23, initially deployed in 1989, is a three-stage, liquid-propellant missile designed by the State Missile Center Makeyev. It can carry four warheads to a range of over 8,000-km and is launched from Delta IV subma-rines.565 An upgrade of the SS-N-23, known as SINEVA, was completed in 2007 by the Kras-noyarsk Machine Building Plant.566

The SS-N-32 BULAVA is a solid-propellant, sea-launched ballistic missile that underwent a 19-year development cycle at the Moscow Insti-tute of Thermal Technology.567 The BULAVA can carry up to six independent nuclear war-heads to a range of around 8,000 kilometers, is

in service on the DOLGORUKIY-class subma-rines, and is replacing older SLBMs in the Rus-sian inventory.568, 569

Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBM)

The SS-21 TOCHKA is a mobile, single-stage, solid-propellant missile; it originally entered ser-vice around 1976. The latest TOCHKA-U version entered service in 1990 and is the most capable system (maximum range of 120 kilometers, iner-tial navigation with GLONASS updates, and radar or optical terminal guidance).570, 571

SS-26 ISKANDER-M is a mobile, sin-gle-stage, solid-propellant missile that is replacing the SS-21. The ISKANDER is equipped with an inertial/GLONASS guid-ance system and either radar, electro-op-tical, or infrared image matching termi-nal guidance system, enabling it to strike moving targets.572

Russian ISKANDER-M missile system.

Image Source: AFP

Cruise Missile Sector

Russia’s 2011–2020 State Armament Program also places a priority focus on the development and production of highly capable cruise missile systems.573 Russia has invested heavily in the development of air-, ground-, and sea-launched cruise missiles, and the development or refur-bishment of associated launch platforms.574 In addition to developing domestic variants, Russia is focused on producing export variants of sev-eral cruise missile systems to remain competi-tive in the international arms market.575

Russia’s Tactical Missile Corporation

Russia’s Federal Target Program for “Restruc-turing and Development of [the] Defense Indus-try (2002–2006)” and a Presidential decree in January 2002 prompted the establishment of the Tactical Missile Corporation (KRTV). The corpo-ration, which has oversight of 30 weapon manu-facturing enterprises, is Russia’s largest devel-oper and producer of anti-ship, anti-radar, and multipurpose missiles for tactical airborne, ship borne, and coastal cruise missile systems.576, 577

In 2014, the General Director of KRTV reported that the corporation received about $1 billion from the Federally Targeted Program for the Development of the Defense Industry (OPK) through 2020 to help modernize and re-equip production facilities.578, 579 To increase produc-tion capacity, Russia focused on improving production facilities in anticipation of the high production demands under the State Arma-ment Program 2020.580

Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCM)

Russia is in the process of refurbishing its long-range strategic bombers to carry the new-est air-launched cruise missiles, the Kh-101 (conventional) and the Kh-102 (nuclear-vari-ant). These missiles were developed by the Raduga Science and Production Association [Machine-Building Design Bureau], a Tacti-cal Missile Corporation subsidiary located in Dubna.581 The missiles are the follow-on sys-tem to the Kh-55, the main armament of Rus-sia’s Tu-95 and Tu-160 bombers.582, 583

Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCM)

The KALIBR-family of cruise missiles are some of Russia’s most capable systems. Designed by the Novator Design Bureau, a subsidiary of Almaz-Antey, the KALIBR-class missiles are the more capable domestic ver-sions of the CLUB-family, which Russia has exported for several years.584 The KALIBR class of missiles reportedly has an operational range up to 2,500 kilometers and has a lower flight profile than other Russian cruise mis-sile systems.585, 586 The 3M-14 (SS-N-30A) is a long-range, land-attack cruise missile capa-ble of carrying conventional or nuclear war-heads.587 The 3M-54 (SS-N-27A) is an anti-ship missile, capable of being launched from submarine and surface ships.588

The ONIKS (SS-N-26) anti-ship cruise mis-sile is another capable weapon system pro-duced in Russia that also has a land-based variant, the BASTION mobile shore-based missile complex.589

RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

Russia is also developing and testing the TSIRKON, its first hypersonic anti-ship cruise missile. This missile, which is expected to enter service in 2018, will have a 500 to 1,000-km range.590 Once operational, the nuclear-pow-ered guided missile cruiser ADMIRAL NAKH-IMOV will be one of the first naval vessels to carry these cruise missiles.591

Russia demonstrated some of its newest capa-bilities in military technology in its Syria cam-paign. Russia’s use of the KALIBR sea-launched cruise missile, including launches from a sub-merged submarine, and of the Kh-101 air-launched cruise missile for the first time in a combat situation demonstrated its advance-ments in precision-guided munitions.592

Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAM)

Russia’s surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems remain among the best in the world, and Russia maintains a robust production capacity to sat-isfy both domestic and export requirements. In recent years, Russia has also developed several highly-capable SAM systems and has invested in new infrastructure to support aggressive SAM production schedules.593 Many countries, including China, are interested in acquiring some of Russia’s longer-range systems.594

Almaz-Antey is Russia’s primary company responsible for development and production of air defense systems, including land-based and naval short, medium, and long-range air defense mis-sile systems, ground surveillance radar stations, and automated control systems. Almaz-Antey formed in 2002 as a result of a merger between Antey Corporation and NPO Almaz.595, 596

Long-Range SAMs

Russia is adding new defense infrastructure to increase production of its newest long-range SAM system, the S-400; S-400 (SA-21) regi-ments are operational throughout Russia.597, 598

The ANTEY-2500 is a long-range air defense system that reportedly can engage short-and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, precision-guided weapons, strategic and tactical aircraft, as well as early warning and electronic warfare aircraft.599

S-400 long-range SAM system.

Image Source: AFP

ANTEY-2500 long-range SAM system.

Image Source: AFP

Short-to-Medium Range Priority SAMs

The PANTSIR-S/S1 is a short-range air defense system developed by the KBP (Instrument Design Bureau) Tula. It is armed with 12 missiles and two 30-mm anti-aircraft guns; for target acquisition and tracking it uses two radars and an electro-optical system. It was designed to defend ground instal-lations and longer-range SAM systems against a variety of weapon systems, including fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, precision guided missiles and cruise missiles, and unmanned air vehicles.600 It is usually deployed as a battery of 4–6 combat vehicles per site and each combat vehicle can engage up to four targets simultaneously. Russian air force plans to acquire 100–120 PANTSIR-S/S1 combat vehicles by 2020.601

Developmental Systems

The S-500 is a developmental system expected to have the capability to simultaneously engage 10 targets at a maximum range of 600 kilometers; it is expected to be operational around 2020.602

The Vityaz is a short-to-medium-range SAM system; Russia hopes to produce up to 30 sys-tems by 2020.603 The Vityaz system reportedly can carry two types of missiles, the 9M96E missiles or the 9M100.

Air Sector

In 2006, Russia’s United Aircraft Corpora-tion (UAC) was created to consolidate air-craft design and production companies under one state controlled corporation. UAC con-

trols 18 companies responsible for the design and production of most military and civilian aircraft.604, 605 UAC will have to deliver over 1,000 new airplanes and helicopters to Rus-sia’s military forces by 2020 to meet modern-ization goals established in the 2011–2020 State Armament Program.606

Bombers

Russia plans to upgrade and operate its fleet of Tu-160/BLACKJACK, Tu-95MS BEAR H, and Tu-22M/BACKFIRE bombers beyond 2030.607, 608 The upgrades are intended to keep older aircraft operational until the fifth-gener-ation PAK-DA bomber reaches production. The PAK-DA will have new navigation systems and the capability to deploy Kh-101/Kh-102 air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs).609, 610, 611, 612, 613

Russia has restarted Tu-160M2/BLACKJACK initial production to fill a critical gap in air-craft availability. Serial production of new Tu-160M2/BLACKJACK bombers is scheduled to begin no earlier than 2023 at the Kazan Air-craft Plant. The new bombers will have NK-32

PAK-FA (T-50) fighter.

Image Source: AFP

RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

engines, which will be produced at the Sama-ra-based enterprise Kuznetsov, currently being modernized to start production by 2020.614

Fighters

Russian fighter production occurs at several plants, including the Sukhoi Aircraft-Man-ufacturing Plants in Komsomolsk, Irkutsk and Novosibirsk, which produce the Su-30SM, Su-34, and Su-35; the MiG plants in Lukhovitsy and Nizhniy Novgorod produce the MiG-29.615

The fifth-generation fighter (PAK-FA) pro-gram began in 2008 and is a high-priority item for the Russian air force. Six flying prototype aircraft were completed through 2016, with additional prototype aircraft in testing by the end of 2016. The Ministry of Defense plans to start serial production this year with the goal of producing 12 for the air force by 2020.616, 617

Helicopters

The state corporation Russian Helicopters operates five primary helicopter plants that produce the Ka 52 and Mi-28 attack variants, Mi-8/17, Mi-35, Mi-26, and ANSAT for the armed forces and for export.618, 619 Moscow’s pre-vious reliance on helicopter engines produced in Ukraine has not adversely affected Russia’s ability to meet the needs of its military.620

Transport Aircraft

The UAC is responsible for operating two large aircraft production plants at Kazan and Uly-anovsk. Russia is producing its new transport, the Il-76MD-90A, which is a redesign of the

Il-76/CANDID transport, and plans to produce 39 Il-76MD-90A planes by 2020.621 The Ily-ushin Design Bureau has begun development of the Il-78MD-90A refueler and the Il-112 light military transport, based on Il-76 air-frame design.622, 623

Naval Sector

In an effort to streamline the design and con-struction of surface ships and submarines, President Putin established the United Ship-building Corporation in 2007 to provide over-sight of all major domestic military and civil-ian shipbuilding. The corporation includes approximately 40 companies, including design bureaus and shipyards. Russia is currently upgrading and modernizing its naval fleet, con-structing multi-role platforms with modular designs.624 However, some new platforms have taken up to, or over, a decade to com-plete construction and to enter into service as Russia’s shipbuilding industry is besieged by sanctions. Moscow is working to overcome the negative effects of international sanctions by becoming more self-reliant, indigenously pro-ducing components formerly purchased from foreign suppliers.625

Russia currently has eight operational shipyards dedicated to surface ship and submarine con-struction. While construction of patrol boats and corvettes has continued at a steady pace, major combatants and amphibious ships have encoun-tered significant delays. For example, the Yantar Shipyard has faced difficulties meeting produc-tion deadlines during construction of the GRIG-OROVICH FFG and IVAN GREN LST.

Surface Combatants

Construction of the ADMIRAL GRIGOR-OVICH and GORSHKOV-class frigates, along with the STEREGUSHCHIY-class corvette, was to mark Russia’s return as a shipbuilding power and are intended to become the back-bone of the fleet. A total of 17 of the ships (6 GRIGOROVICH, 4 GORSHKOV, and 8 STE-REGUSHCHIY) were ordered to be built. Final delivery of over half of these ships was dis-rupted due to the lack of gas turbine and die-sel engines from Ukraine’s Zorya-Mashproyekt State Gas-Turbine Manufacturing Enterprise.626

Delivery of three GRIGOROVICH and two GORSHKOV frigates were eventually can-celled because domestically-produced gas-tur-bine engines would not be ready before 2020. The imported engines for the STEREGUSH-CHIY corvettes have been replaced by domes-tic diesel engines produced by the Kolomna Engine Plant in Moscow, allowing for the pro-duction of corvettes and patrol boats to con-tinue at a steady pace in spite of construction delays to the larger ships.627

The Russian Navy has one operational air-craft carrier in its inventory, the 26-year-old ADMIRAL KUZNETSOV, which is expected to enter a 2- to 3-year overhaul period beginning in 2018. This overhaul is not scheduled to consist of any major mod-ernization or modifications and will keep the KUZNETSOV in the fleet until a new aircraft carrier becomes operational.628 The Murmansk Shipyard is planning to convert and enlarge its drydock to overhaul the KUZNETSOV and to provide maintenance/repair service for large commercial ships. When complete, the result will be the coun-try’s largest drydock (400 x 80 meters).629

Russia is planning to start the design of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (the Shtorm) in 2020, with completion by 2030. Based on a model mock-up and initial infor-mation, the carrier will have a beam of 40 meters and draft of 11 meters. Shtorm will be 330 meters in length, shorter than the U.S. Navy’s newest carrier but 10% lon-ger and wider than the KUZNETSOV. The Shtorm will have RITM-200 nuclear reac-tors, a catapult, and two ski-jump ramps for launching aircraft and will be able to carry up to 90 aircraft and helicopters.630

Submarines

Historically the backbone of the Russian Navy, 75% of the 61 operational submarines are over 20 years old and are slowly being replaced. Rus-sia will continue production of its fourth-gen-eration DOLGORUKIY-class submarines through 2020. There are currently three in

GORSHKOV-class Frigate.

Image Source: Shutterstock

RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

service, with an additional eight scheduled to enter service in the coming years. Russia is also planning to construct a fifth-generation strate-gic missile SSBN between 2031 and 2050.631, 632

The YASEN-class SSGN (Project 855, aka SEVERODVINSK) will replace aging VICTOR III SSNs. The YASEN is produced at the Sevmash shipyard; the first of up to 10 hulls was delivered to the Navy in 2014, but the program has encountered delays. The flagship of the class (hull 1) required 16 years to com-plete; hull 2 should soon be completed after 7 years.633 Modernization and upgrade efforts are occurring on the OSCAR II SSGN and SIERRA II SSNs. The improved KILO SSK class (Project 636.3) is being produced with-out significant delays. The initial order of 6 was expanded to 12 in early 2016. The first three KILOS were delivered to the Black Sea Fleet in 2014–2015.634

Ground Arms

Since 2010, there have been significant improve-ments in the condition of Russian ground arms, including the modernization and upgrade of the main battle tank (MBT) inventory. The active inventory includes the T-72, T-80U, and T-90 MBTs.635 The T-72 is one of Russia’s oldest active MBTs and has been upgraded to include substantial enhancements in explosive reactive armor, electronic components, and enhanced navigation systems.636 Russia’s newest in-service MBT, the T-90, features the new Sonsa-U sight-ing systems and Shtora soft-kill active protection system.637 While Russia’s Ministry of Defense planned to phase out the T-80, the Omsk Trans-port Machine Building Plant, one of Russia’s two MBT production and modernization facilities, is planning to upgrade the T-80U with Sosna-U, Relikt third-generation dynamic protection com-plex, and advanced radio and C2 systems. 638

New Technology

The Uralvagonzavod (UVZ) Corporation is Rus-sia’s primary MBT production and moderniza-tion center and is responsible for the production of Russia’s newest MBT (the Armata) to fulfill part of the 2020 and 2025 State Armament Pro-gram.639, 640 The new-generation T-14 Armata MBT is being used as a common chassis for the Army’s heavy armored vehicles, including the T-15 Armata heavy infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) and the Koalitsiya-SV 2S35 self-propelled howitzer.641 This universal platform offers the Russian defense industry a more streamlined

YASEN SSGN Hull 1.

Image Source: Shutterstock

means of armored vehicle production and will reduce maintenance and modernization costs in the future.

Like the Armata, the Kurganets-25—slated to begin production in 2018—will provide a lighter, universal tracked platform for new IFVs and armored personnel carriers.642 The Bumerang wheeled armored personnel car-rier has completed preliminary testing as of June 2016.643, 644 Russia will continue to field the BMP-3 (~700 units), BMP-2 (~1,800 units), and BMP-1 (~500 units) while new systems are designed and produced.645 The BMP-3 is Russia’s most modern IFV in service.646

Russian artillery modernization efforts include the Koalitsiya-SV 2S35 152-mm self-propelled howitzer, which is intended to be the future of Russian self-propelled artillery units and will ultimately phase out the 2S19 Msta-S.647 Several of Russia’s multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) have also been improved: the URAGAN 220mm MRL, the SMERCH 300mm MRL, and the new TORNADO-2 300 MRL, which is a modernized version of the SMERCH.648 Russian MRLs are produced in large quantities for the Russian Army and export customers worldwide.649

T-14 Armata Tank.

Image Source: AFP

RUSSIA MILITARY POWER Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

APPENDIX H: Arms Sales

Russia remains the second largest arms exporter worldwide, in terms of the annual value of both its export contracts and equip-ment deliveries. Russia’s arms export strat-egy included planning $13 billion in annual sales through 2016, and thereafter seeking growth until 2020.650 In 2016, Russian officials announced that Moscow exported $14.5 billion in military products in 2015.651

Russia is an exporter of nearly every category of conventional military equipment, from small arms to long-range air defense systems and submarines. Moscow sees great prospects in the global arms marketplace for many of its prod-ucts. In the aircraft sector, Su-35, Su-30 and MiG-29 fighter aircraft, Yak-130 combat train-ers, and a variety of Mil and Kamov helicopters are key products. In the air defense sector, S-400 TRIUMF, ANTEY-2500, BUK-M2E, and TOR-M2E surface-to-air missile systems, the PAN-TSIR-S1 air defense missile/gun system, and IGLA-S MANPADS are top sellers. Frigates, submarines, and patrol boats are best-selling naval exports. Russia’s land warfare products are centered on T-90 tanks, BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles, and Tigr armored cars.652

Marketing, contracting, and exporting Rus-sian defense products is executed by state company Rosoboronexport (ROE). ROE typi-cally accounts for approximately 85% of Rus-sia’s total exports of weapons and military hardware. It ships Russian defense products to about 70 countries and cooperates with

over 700 Russian defense industry companies. ROE is incorporated into Rostec (formerly known as Russian Technologies or Rostech-nologii), the state corporation established in 2007 to promote the development, production, and export of civilian and military high tech-nology products.653 Although ROE manages the majority of Russian arms trade, over 15 companies are authorized to export products abroad directly, most often spare parts and maintenance services, and these contracts account for about $2 billion annually.654

Russia’s largest export markets for arms are the Middle East/North Africa and the Asia-Pa-cific regions. Russia also maintains sales in Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and some parts of Europe, although at a much lower level.655 Moscow is seeking to grow its market share in Southeast Asia and Latin America especially. Russia also is committed to expand-ing high-level military technical cooperation with other member states of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa).656, 657

Russia is taking steps to overcome challenges and remain competitive in the global arms mar-ket. ROE increasingly has been offering com-mercial credit for arms transactions, especially to countries in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa that cannot afford to purchase expensive equip-ment or upgrade their armed forces without financial assistance. Similarly, Russian officials have acknowledged that exchanging arms for access to customers’ natural resources may be

necessary to stave off competition from other suppliers.658 President Putin has expressed Moscow’s willingness to improve financing options for contracts, expand offerings for joint production and local assembly of defense equip-ment in customers’ countries, and improve upon post-sale support and equipment servicing.659

Moscow casts itself as a reliable and predict-able arms trade partner that does not make

its commitments dependent on market prefer-ences or political trends.660 Russia also is tout-ing the effectiveness of its combat operations in Syria and using this to add cachet to its military products for export. Moscow believes that advertising many of its weapons systems as combat-proven will generate additional interest and orders from customers.661

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172 Unattributed. “Russian General Gives Data On Military Research.” Moscow Interfax-AVN, 4 Mar 2011, http://www.militarynews.ru. Accessed 6 Mar 2011.173 Unattributed. “Russian Army Revises State Defense Order, Suspends Military Education Reform.” Moscow Interfax-AVN, 14 Nov 2012. http://www.militarynews.ru. Accessed 14 Nov 2012.174 Unattributed. “Russia, Syria did not strike at areas agreed on in Geneva in past week – Rudskoi.” Interfax in English, 19 Sep 2016, http://www.interfax.com/. Accessed 19 Sep 2016.175 Unattributed. “Russia, U.S. exchange info on ceasefire in Syria - Russian Defense Ministry.” Interfax in English, 27 Feb 2016, http://www.interfax.com/. Accessed 27 Feb 2016.176 Russian Ministry of Defense. “Biography of Russian Pres-ident Putin.” http://eng.mil.ru/en/management/leader.htm. Accessed 14 Oct 2016.177 Unattributed. “1.18 The Powers of the Russian-Federation President in the Sphere of Command and Control of the Rus-sian-Federation Armed Forces in Peacetime and Wartime.” Chernyye Dyry V Rossisykom Zakondatelstve, 1 Oct 2007, www.K-press.ru/bh. Accessed 8 Nov 2007.178 Petrov, Ivan. "Young and Stern: The Generals Will Be Discharged by a 42-Year-Old Veteran of the State Emergency Committee." RBK Daily, 6 Nov 2008.179 Unattributed. “1.18 The Powers of the Russian-Federation President in the Sphere of Command and Control of the Rus-sian-Federation Armed Forces in Peacetime and Wartime.” Chernyye Dyry V Rossisykom Zakondatelstve, 1 Oct 2007, www.K-press.ru/bh. Accessed 8 Nov 2007.180 President of the Russian Federation. “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, approved by Russian Federation President V. Putin.” Official website of the Russian Federation president, 31 Dec 2014, http://www.kremlin.ru. Accessed 31 Dec 2014.181 Miranovich, Gennadiy. “Defense of the Country: Scientific Approach.” Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda, 31 Jan 2014, http://www.redstar.ru. Accessed 19 Feb 2014.182 tUnattributed. “Personnel Training System for Russian Ground Forces Will Be Improved – Commander-in-Chief.” Moscow Interfax-AVN, 3 Oct 2014, http://www.interfax.com/. Accessed 3 Oct 2014.183 Yarynich, Valery E. “C3: Nuclear Command, Control, Co-operation.” Conference paper, 2003. Source is former Russian General Staff officer and SRF member.184 Bozhov, Oleg. "How They Will Wage War in the Future: Tanks Rumbled Across the Sky." MK Online, 13 Aug 2016, http://mk.ru/. Accessed 13 Aug 2016.

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296 Darczewska. “The Anatomy of Russian Information War-fare. The Crimea Operation, a Case Study.”297 Pomerantsev, Peter and Weiss, Michael. “The Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, Culture, and Money.” The Interpreter, Institute of Modern Russia, 22 Nov 2014, p. 5, http://www.interpretermag. com/wp-con-tent/uploads/2014/ll/The_Menace_of_ Unreality_Final.pdf. Accessed 2 Aug 2015.298 Haines, “Russia’s Use of Disinformation in the Ukraine Conflict.”299 Unattributed. “CyberBerkut – The New Russian Proxy?” SecuInsight, 12 Jun 2014, http://www.secuinsight.fr/2014/06/12/is-cyberberkut-the-new-russian-proxy/. Ac-cessed 18 Mar 2015.300 Unattributed. “Pro-Russian Hackers Claim 1,100 Ukrainian Soldiers Killed in Past Two Weeks." RIA Novosti, 28 Jan 2015, http://ria.ru/. Accessed 28 Jan 2015.301 Unattributed. “Ukrainian Presidential Election: Security Ser-vice Thwarts Cyber Plot to Rig Results.” Kyiv Post Online, 25 May 2014, http://www.kyivpost.com/. Accessed 25 May 2014.302 Unattributed. “Ukrainian State Agency Refutes Reports of Hacker Attack on Central Elections Commission Web-site.” UNN Online, 25 Oct 2014, http://www.unn.com.ua/. Accessed 25 Oct 2014.303 Unattributed. “Alert: Ukrainian State Agency Confirms DDoS Attack on Central Elections Commission Website.” UNN Online, 25 Oct 2014, http://www.unn.com.ua/. Ac-cessed 25 Oct 2014.304 Chen, Adrian. “The Agency.” New York Times, 2 Jun 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/magazine/the-agency.html?_r=0. Accessed 2 Sept 2016.305 Walker, Shaun. “Salutin’ Putin: Inside a Russian Troll House.” Guardian, 2 Apr 2015, http://www.guardian.co.uk. Accessed 2 Apr 2015.306 Garfield, Leanna. “5 Countries that use bots to spread political propaganda.” Tech Insider, 16 Dec 2015, http://www.techinsider.io/political-bots-by-governments-around-the-world-2015. Accessed 28 Sep 2016.307 Chen, Adrian. “The Agency.” New York Times, 2 Jun 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/magazine/the-agency.html?_r=0. Accessed 2 Sept 2016.308 Yegorov, Ivan. "Network Requires Protection. New Information Security Doctrine to Be Adopted This Year.” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, 18 Jul 2016, http://rg.ru/. Accessed 29 Sep 2016.

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309 Baikova, Tatyana. "It Would Be Better for America to Ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty." Izvestiya, 10 Sep 2016.310 Unattributed. “Central Asia Military.” Highlights: Central Asia Military Issues, 17 Aug 2016, http://www.interfax.com/. Accessed 4 Nov 2016.311 Unattributed. “Russia’s Duma Adopts Revised Anti-Terror Bill.” RIA Novosti, 24 Jun 2016, http://ria.ru/. Accessed 24 Jun 2016.312 Afanasyeva, Anna. “With Share of Loyalty. Why State Is Taking Control Not Just of Media.” Kommersant Online, 30 Dec 2016, http://kommersant.ru/. Accessed 4 Jan 2017.313 Unattributed. “Communications Ministry Mulls Total Control over Russian Sector of the Web - Reports.” RT Online, 19 Aug 2016, http://rt.com/. Accessed 19 Aug 2016.314 Unattributed. “Putin Bans Foreigners from Russian TV Audience Research.” TASS, 4 Jul 2016, http://tass.ru/. Ac-cessed 4 Jul 2016.315 Rogozin, D.O. Ed. “War and Peace: Terms and Definition—Voyna I Mir V Terminakh I Opredeleniyakh.” Military-Political Dictionary,, ProRog, 2011.316 Rogozin, “War and Peace: Terms and Definitions—Voyna I Mir V Terminakh I Opredeleniyakh.”317 Borkovskyy, Antin. "Andriy Illarionov on Prospects for Cease-Fire, Putin's 'Ukrainian Plan,' Likelihood of Use of Nuclear Weapons." Espreso TV Online, 26 May 2015, http://www.espreso.tv. Accessed 26 May 2015.318 Suvorov, Viktor, “Chapter 8: The Agent Network.” Spetsnaz: The Inside Story of the Soviet Special Forces. W.W. Norton, 1988.319 Kuznetsov, V.I., et al. “Electronic Warfare and Information War-fare: How They Compare.” Military Thought, vol. 1, 1 May 2013.320 Dvornikov V.A., et al. “Tactics of Electronic Warfare Forces.” Military Thought, vol. 1, 2015.321 Donskov, Col. Yu. Ye. and Nikitin, Lt. Col. O. G. “Special In-formation Operations in Armed Conflicts.” Military Thought; 30 Sep 2005. The authors are leading Russian military scientists.322 Melnikov, Igor. “Weapons of Assymetrical Response.” Ros-tov-na-Donu Voyennyy Vestnik Yuga Rossii, 11 Apr 2015.323 Donskov “Special Information Operations in Armed Conflicts.”324 Dvornikov, “Tactics of Electronic Warfare Forces.”325 Durnovo, Aleksey. “Long Range Aviation -- Air Force's Main Strike Force.” Ekho Moskvy Online, 26 Feb 2016.

326 President of Russia. “Visit to the Armed Forces Central Command Centre, 6 Jun 2013.” Official Website of the Rus-sian Federation President, 7 Jun 2013, http://eng.kremlin.ru/. Accessed 7 Jun 2013.327 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. “The Navy Begins the Implementation of the Long-Range Maritime Zone Support Vessel Renewal Program.” Russian Federation Min-istry of Defense Information and Press Service Directorate, 21 Jan 2013, http://www.mil.ru. Accessed 21 Jan 2013.328 Unattributed. “Russia, Venezuela to Have Joint Naval Drill in Atlantic Ocean.” Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey, 8 Sep 2008, www.militarynews.ru. Accessed 8 Sep 2008.329 Unattributed. "The Large ASW Ship Severomorsk Is Escorting Another Convoy of Three Ships." Severnyy Flot, 22 Mar 2013, http://pressa-sf.livejournal.com/. Accessed 22 Mar 2013.330 Unattributed. "The Large ASW Ship Severomorsk Is Escorting Another Convoy of Three Ships." Severnyy Flot, 22 Mar 2013, http://pressa-sf.livejournal.com/. Accessed 22 Mar 2013.331 Unattributed. "The Large ASW Ship Severomorsk Is Escort-ing Another Convoy of Three Ships." Severnyy Flot, 22 Mar 2013, http://pressa-sf.livejournal.com/. Accessed 22 Mar 2013.332 Unattributed. “Syria Conflict: US Presses Russia on Military Buildup.” BBC, 16 Sep 2015.333 Unattributed. “Russia starts ground operations in Syria.” 23 Nov 2015, Al Bawaba Business.334 Quinlivan, James T. “War on the Rocks—Artillery Returns to the Battlefield in the War Against ISIL.” 11 Jan 2016.335 Unattributed. “RPT – Fight for Syria’s Aleppo Exposes Limits of Russian Air Power.” Reuters, 30 Aug 2016.336 Unattributed. “Syria: Russia’s continuing war.” BBC, 27 Apr 2016.337 McInnis, J. Matthew. “What does Iran Really Want in Ye-men?” AEI Ideas, 13 Apr 2015.338 Unattributed. “Fight for Syria’s Aleppo Exposes Limits of Russian Air Power.” Channel Newsasia, 29 Aug 2016.339 Unattributed. “Russian Cruise Missiles Target Syria.” Zaman al-Wasl, 19 Aug 2016. Accessed 19 Aug 2016.340 Unattributed. “Syria: Russia’s continuing war.” BBC, 27 Apr 2016.341 Kozhanov, Nikolay. “What’s at stake for Russia in Syria?” BBC, Chatham House, 21 Sep 2015.

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342 Lavrov, Anton and Ramm, Aleksey. “Retribution without Refueling: Operation in Syria Reveals Weak Points in Aero-space.” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer, 6 Apr 2016, http://vpk-news.ru/. Accessed 13 Apr 2016.343 1991 Military Forces in Transition. U.S. Department of Defense, Sep 1991, p. 41.344 1991 Military Forces in Transition. U.S. Department of Defense, Sep 1991, p. 40.345 1991 Military Forces in Transition. U.S. Department of Defense, Sep 1991, p. 40.346 1991 Military Forces in Transition. U.S. Department of Defense, Sep 1991, p. 40.347 Gavrilov, Yuriy. “The Order Will Come from the Center: National Defense Management Center, a Top-Secret Complex, Will Go On Alert Duty on 1 Dec.” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, 27 Oct 2014, http://rg.ru/. Accessed 1 Nov 2014.348 Military Encyclopedic Dictionary of the Strategic Rocket Forces. Ministry of Defense, 1999, p. 521.349 V.D. Zabolotin and N.E. Dimitriev. “Operational-Tactical Ma-skirovka.” Slovar’ voyennykh terminov” [Dictionary of Military Terms], 2000, p. 95. The Dictionary was the definitive General Staff Academy reference work on Russian military terminology at the time of publication.350 Ministry of Defense. “Maskirovka.” Military Encyclopedia, vol. 5, p. 23.351 V.D. Zabolotin and N.E. Dimitriev, “Surprise.” Slovar’ voyennykh terminov [Dictionary of Military Terms], 2000, p. 24.352 Pynnoniemi, Katri and Racz, Andraz, Eds. Fog of Falsehood: Russian Strategy of Deception and the Conflict in Ukraine. The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Report 45, 2016.353 Robert, James Q. “Maskirovka 2.0 Hybrid Threat, Hybrid Response.” Joint Special Operations University – Center for Special Operations Study and Research, Dec 2015.354 Pomerantsev and Weiss, “The Menace of Unreality.”355 Chekinov, S., Bogdanov, S., “The Nature and Content of a New Generation War,” Voennaya Mysl, no. 4, 2013.356 Shevchenko, Vitaly. “Little green men or Russian invad-ers?” BBC News, 9 Mar 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26532154. Accessed on 9 Mar 2015.357 President of the Russian Federation. “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, approved by Russian Federation President V. Putin.” Official website of the Russian Federation president, 31 Dec 2014, http://www.kremlin.ru. Accessed 31 Dec 2014.

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374 Unattributed. “Rubezh Missile Will Enter Duty in a Year.” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, 12 May 2016, http://rg.ru/. Ac-cessed 12 May 2016.375 Unattributed. “‘Missile defense killer’: Russia finalizes test-ing on prototype ICBM.” RT, 8 Jun 2013, www.rt.com/news/missile-defense-killer-prototype-411/. Accessed 28 Mar 2017.376 Litovkin, Viktor. “RS-26 Antimissile Defense 'Killer' Flies Where It Must.” Nezavisimaya Gazeta Online, 9 Oct 2013, http://www.ng.ru/. Accessed 16 Oct 2013.377 Unattributed. “Jane's, Sentinel Security Assessment – Russia and the CIS, Strategic Weapon System, Russian Federation.” IHS Jane’s 360, 25 Apr 2016, www.janes.com. Accessed 6 Sept 2016.378 Unattributed. “Jane's, Sentinel Security Assessment – Russia and the CIS, Strategic Weapon System, Russian Federation.” IHS Jane’s 360, 25 Apr 2016, www.janes.com. Accessed 6 Sept 2016.379 Unattributed. “Jane's, Sentinel Security Assessment – Russia and the CIS, Strategic Weapon System, Russian Federation.” IHS Jane’s 360, 25 Apr 2016, www.janes.com. Accessed 6 Sept 2016.380 “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2016.” http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2016.1170359. Accessed 6 Sep 2016.381 Bozhyeva, Olga. "Sources: Russia Successfully Tested New Missile Superweapon: Developers Called Launch of Sarmat ICBM Warhead a 'Fantastic Success.'" MK Online, 21 Apr 2016. http://mk.ru/.382 NEW START TREATY Text. 8 Apr 2010.383 Andreyev, Oleg. “RVSN Given Six Years to Rearm; Moscow Adjusts Plans to Enhance Combat Readiness of the Armed Forces.” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 18 May 2016, http://www.ng.ru/. Accessed 19 May 2016.384 “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2016.” http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2016.1170359. Accessed 6 Sep 2016.385 Unattributed. “Key Russian Strategic Missile Deployments.” Jane's CBRN Assessments, 25 Apr 2016, www.janes.com. Accessed 25 Apr 2016.386 “Russian Army Order of Battle.” Globalsecurity.org, 27 Aug 2016. Accessed 29 Aug 2016.387 “Chapter Five: Russia and Eurasia, The Military Balance,” 2017, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2017.1271211, p. 211.388 Russian Ministry of Defense. “Ground Troops.” Website of the Russian Ministry of Defense, 2 Sep 2016, www.mil.ru. Accessed 2 Sept 2016.

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416 Unattributed. “The VDV Will in the Coming Years Be-come Part of the Rapid-Response Force.” Argumenty i Fak-ty, 4 Jun 2015, www.aif.ru/society/army/vdv_v_blizhayshie_gody_voydut_v_sostav_voysk_bystrogo_reagirovaniya. Accessed 7 Jun 2015.417 “The Soviet Army: Special Warfare and Rear Area Support.” U.S. Army, FM100-2-2, pp. 2-2–2-3.418 “The Soviet Army: Special Warfare and Rear Area Support.” U.S. Army, FM100-2-2, pp. 2-2–2-3.419 “VDV ORBAT.” globalsecurity.org, 2015.420 Ptichin, Sergey. "Authority": "Air Assault Force Will Change to Tanks." Moscow Rossiskaya Gazeta online in Russian, 24 May 2016.421 Unattributed. "All Airborne Assault Formations of the Air-borne Troops will Receive Tank Companies." Moscow Lenta.ru in Russian, 1 Aug 2016.422 “The Soviet Army: Special Warfare and Rear Area Support; Amphibious Operations.” U.S. Army, FM100-2-2, p. 4 1.423 2017 Jane's World Navies, https://janes-ihs-com.pen-tagonlibrary.idm.oclc.org/WorldNavies/Display/1322754.424 Official Press Release. “Motorized Riflemen and Naval Infantrymen of the Baltic Fleet Are Performing Life-Fire Drills as Part of Squads.” Moscow Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 11 Jul 2016, function.mil.ru/news page/country/more?id12089569@egNews. Accessed 12 Jul 2016.425 Khudoleyev, Victor. “Country Celebrated Missile Troops and Artillery Day on 19 Nov": "Heading for a Reconnaissance-Fire Delivery System.” Krasnaya Zvezda Online, 21 Nov 2014, http://www.redstar.ru. Accessed 12 Dec 2014.426 Unattributed. “PF coastal troops redeployed as part of sur-prise checks into combat readiness.” Interfax, 15 Sep 2014, http://www.interfax.com/. Accessed 15 Sep 2014.427 2017 Jane's World Navies, https://janes-ihs-com.pen-tagonlibrary.idm.oclc.org/WorldNavies/Display/1322754.428 Avdeyev, Yuriy. “Navy Coastal Troops' Acquisition of New Missile Systems Continues.” Krasnaya Zvezda Online, 2 Nov 2015, http://www.redstar.ru. Accessed 9 Nov 2015.429 Unattributed. “Pacific Fleet Bal Coastal Missile System Battalion Starts Field Training in Primorye.” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 17 Feb 2016, http://www.mil.ru. Accessed 3 Mar 2016.430 Bodner, Matthew. “Russian Military Merges Air Force and Space Command.” The Moscow Times, 3 Aug 2015.

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463 Bender, Jeremy. “Russia is Modernizing its increasingly ag-gressive air force.” Business Insider, 18 Mar 2015, www.busi-nessinsider.com/russia-is-modernizing-its-air-force-2015-3.464 Bender, Jeremy. “Russia is Modernizing its increasing-ly aggressive air force.” Business Insider, 18 Mar 2015, www.businessinsider.com/russia-is-modernizing-its-air-force-2015-3.465 Vaev, Pavel K. “Russian Air Power Tool Brittle for Brinkmanship.” Ponars Eurasia, Policy Memo 398, Nov 2014.466 Truffer, Patrick. “The Development of Russian Naval Capabilities After the Cold War.” CIMSEC, 24 Nov 2015, http://cimsec.org/development-russian-naval-capabili-ties-cold-war/20147.467 “Military balance 2015.” Annual periodical on World Military Forces. Routledge, 2015.468 Polmar, Norman. Guide to the Soviet Navy. Naval Institute Press, 1985.469 Pasyakin, Vladimir. “At the Highest Level of Coordination.” Sevastopol Flag Rodiny, 20 Dec 2014, www.sc.mil.ru/. Ac-cessed 25 Jul 2016.470 List of current ships of the Russian Navy – 2016. russian-ships.info, 8 Jun 2016, http://russianships.info/eng/today.471 List of current ships of the Russian Navy – 2016. russian-ships.info, 8 Jun 2016, http://russianships.info/eng/today.472 Flake, Lincoln Edson. “Russia’s Security Intentions in a melting Arctic.” Military and Strategic Affair Publication, vol. 6, no. 1, Mar 2014.473 Zhunusov, Oleg. “Rosneft' Is Taking 'Zvezda' From OSK: A Consortium Will Help the Primorskiy Shipbuilders.” Kommer-sant Online, 22 Aug 2013, http://kommersant.ru/. Accessed 24 Aug 2013.474 “Vladivostok.” Globalsecurity.org/Vladivostok. Accessed 18 Aug 2016.475 The split of forces can be observed on Google Earth. Accessed 17 Aug 2016.476 “List of current ships of the Russian Navy.” russianships.info, http://russianships.info/eng/today. Accessed 8 Jun 2016.477 Zavolokin, Pavel. “The Crimea – Is Under Protection.” Krasnaya Zvezda Online, 6 Feb 2015, http://www.redstar.ru. Accessed 6 Feb 2015.478 Unattributed. “Russia to end production of Varshavyanka Kilo-class submarines.” Moscow RIA Novosti, 4 Sep 2015, http://ria.ru/. Accessed 7 Sep 2015.

479 List of current ships of the Russian Navy – 2016. russian-ships.info, 8 Jun 2016, http://russianships.info/eng/today.480 Yurov, Dmitriy. “Service Reinforced by the Way of Life.” Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda, 16 May 2006, http://www.redstar.ru. Accessed 23 May 2006.481 Russiannavy.com. Information on tasks, roles, and missions. Accessed 18 Aug 2016.482 Unattributed. "Russian Navy to use up to ten civil vessels for military supplies to Syria.” Interfax, 15 Oct 2015, Interfax.com. Accessed 15 Oct 2015.483 Unattributed. “Caspian Flotilla ships carrying Kalibr-NK mis-siles depart for tactical drills.” Interfax, 25 Apr 2016, Interfax.com. Accessed 25 Apr 2016.484 Unattributed. “Caspian Flotilla force ends tactical exercis-es.” Interfax, 8 Jul 2016, Interfax.com. Accessed 8 Jul 2016. 485 Unattributed. “Caspian Flotilla ships carrying Kalibr-NK missiles depart for tactical drills.” Interfax, 25 Apr 2016, Inter-fax.com. Accessed 25 Apr 2016.486 Unattributed. “Jane's, Sentinel Security Assessment – Rus-sia and the CIS, Navy, Russian Federation.” IHS Jane’s 360, 10 Aug 2016, www.janes.com.487 Wertheim, Eric. The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, 16th Edition. Naval Institute Press, 2013, p. 573.488 Litovkin, Dmitriy. "Deep Rising. Russia's Nuclear Sub-marine Fleet Is Being Rapidly Upgraded and Renewed.” Moscow Vzglyad, 28 Jul 2014, http://www.vz.ru/soci-ety/2014/7/28/697642.html. Accessed 3 Aug 2014.489 Unattributed. "Nuclear Submarine Severodvinsk Strikes Coastal Training Target from Barents Sea." RIA Novosti, 2 May 2016, http://ria.ru/. Accessed 2 May 2016.490 Khodarenok, Mikhail. “Strategic Ocean Operations No Longer Are Being Planned: Current Russian Navy Status.” Moscow Gazeta, 31 Jul 2016, http://www.gazeta.ru/. Accessed 6 Aug 2016.491 Blechschmidt, Peter. “War Ships Against Pirates.” Munich Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 21 Nov 2008, Sueddeutsche.de. Accessed 21 Nov 2008.492 List of current ships of the Russian Navy – 2016. russian-ships.info, 8 Jun 2016, http://russianships.info/eng/today.493 Suvorov, Viktor. “Chapter 3. A History of Spetsnaz.” Spetsnaz: The Inside Story of Soviet Special Forces. Translat-ed from Russian by David Floyd. Norton & Company, 1988.

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494 Suvorov, Viktor. “Chapter 3. A History of Spetsnaz.” Spetsnaz: The Inside Story of Soviet Special Forces. Translat-ed from Russian by David Floyd. Norton & Company, 1988.495 Galeotti, Mark. “The rising influence of Russian special forc-es.” Jane's Intelligence Review, 24 Nov 2014, https://janes-ihs-com.pentagonlibrary.idm.oclc.org/Janes/Display/1729350.496 Федеральный конституционный закон "О Правительстве Российской Федерации" [Federal Constitutional Law “Direc-torates of the Russian Federation”]. 17 Dec 1997.497 Schneider, Eberhard. "The Russian Federal Security Ser-vice under President Putin.” Politics and the Ruling Group in Putin’s Russia, Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2008, pp. 42–62.498 Littell, Jonathan. The Security Organs of the Russian Federa-tion. A Brief History 1991–2004. Psan Publishing House, 2006.499 Galeotti, Mark. “Putin’s Hydra: Inside Russia’s Intelligence Services.” European Council on Foreign Relations, May 2016, www.ecfr.eu.500 “Tests Complete for New Staff Module for Russia Power Ministries.” RIA Novosti, 13 Jun 2016.501 “In Russia the National Guard is Created.” Rossiiskoe Voennoe Obozrenie, Issue 4; 30 Apr 2016.502 “National Guard Conducted RCB (NBC) Training of its Units in Volga NG Administrative District (MD).” Vremenniy Informat-sionniy Tsentr, FSBNGRF, 27 Sept 2016.503 “GRU.” Special Services, http://specialsluz.my1.ru/index/gru/0-13.504 Russian News Agency, http://ru-an.info/новости/шпионские-тайны-гру/.505 Safronov, Ivan. "Intelligence to Remain In-House. Who Could Replace Igor Sergun in the Post of Chief of the GRU?" Kommersant Online, 14 Jan 2016, http://kommersant.ru/. Accessed 14 Jan 2016.506 Unattributed. “GRU on 91st Anniversary.” Moscow Vzglyad, 5 Nov 2009, www.vzglyad.ru. Accessed 7 Nov 2009.507 Mikhaylov, Aleksey. "Control of the Main Strike. What Problems Can the New GRU Chief Resolve?" Voyenno-Pro-myshlennyy Kuryer, 10 Feb 2016, http://vpk-news.ru/. Accessed 12 Feb 2016.508 Galeotti, “Putin’s Hydra: Inside Russia’s Intelligence Services.”509 Unattributed. “GRU on 91st Anniversary.” Moscow Vzglyad, 5 Nov 2009, www.vzglyad.ru. Accessed 7 Nov 2009.510 Mikhaylov, "Control of the Main Strike. What Problems Can the New GRU Chief Resolve?"

511 Unattributed. “GRU on 91st Anniversary.” Moscow Vzglyad, 5 Nov 2009, www.vzglyad.ru. Accessed 7 Nov 2009.512 Mikhaylov, "Control of the Main Strike. What Problems Can the New GRU Chief Resolve?"513 Unattributed. “GRU on 91st Anniversary.” Moscow Vzglyad. 5 Nov 2009. www.vzglyad.ru. Accessed 7 Nov 2009.514 Mikhaylov, "Control of the Main Strike. What Problems Can the New GRU Chief Resolve?"515 Unattributed. “GRU on 91st Anniversary.” Moscow Vzglyad. 5 Nov 2009. www.vzglyad.ru. Accessed 7 Nov 2009.516 Mikhaylov, "Control of the Main Strike. What Problems Can the New GRU Chief Resolve?"517 Unattributed. “Russian MP Antoshkin, Recently Back from Syria, says Airstrikes Exceptionally Precise.” Interfax, 15 Oct 2015, http://www.interfax.com/.518 Gorbenko, Aleksandr. "The Russian Military Space Program of Tomorrow: What will This Be?" Odnako Online, 19 Jun 2013, http://www.odnako.org/magazine/new.519 Unattributed. “Russian Military Intelligence Chief Dies Unexpectedly.” Charter 97, 5 Jan 2016, http://www.charter97.org/en/news/.520 Galeotti, Mark. “The Unexpected Death of Russia’s Military Intelligence (GRU) Chief, Igor Sergun.” Moscow’s Shadows, 4 Jan 2016, www.inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com. Accessed 5 Jan 2016.521 Safronov, Ivan. "Intelligence to Remain In-House. Who Could Replace Igor Sergun in the Post of Chief of the GRU?" Kommersant Online, 14 Jan 2016, http://kommersant.ru/. Accessed 14 Jan 2016.522 Unattributed. “Russian GRU Military Spy Chief Igor Sergun dies.” BBC Online, 5 Jan 2016, http://www.bbc.co.uk. Accessed 5 Jan 2016.523 Unattributed. “More evidence that captured Russians were military intelligence officers.” Prava Lyudyny v Ukrayini, 25 Nov 2015, http://khpg.org.ua. Accessed 25 Nov 2015.524 Pereborshchikov, Georgiy. "‘You could say we proved ourselves.’ War stories from Russians returned from fighting in eastern Ukraine." Meduza, 22 Feb 2016, https://meduza.io/en. Accessed 22 Feb 2016.525 Unattributed. “Russia Ramps Up Syria Military Involvement: Pro-Assad.” Beirut NOW, 27 Aug 2015, www.nowlebanon.com. Accessed 27 Aug 2015.

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526 “On Zaslon in Syria.” Russian Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST). LiveJournal, 19 Oct 2015, Livejournal.ru. Accessed 25 Oct 2015.527 Butrin, Dmitriy. "The Prime Minister's Eyes Opened to the Budget—The 'Open Government' Proposes to Buy Textbooks Rather Than Tanks." Kommersant Online, 10 Aug 2012, http://kommersant.ru/.528 Hobson, Peter. “The Cost of Russia's War in Syria.” The Moscow Times Online, 21 Oct 2015, http://www.themoscow-times.com/. Accessed 21 Oct 2015.529 Smirnov, Roman. "Russia's Defense Industry Complex Ready to Fire Salvo at The Crisis." Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye Online, 4 Oct 2015, http://nvo.ng.ru/.530 "Weapons of mass Acquisition." Оборона и безопасность, 1 Apr 2016.531 “With a Key from the Sky—President.” Оборона и безопасность, 1 Apr 2016.532 Zubarevich, Natalya. “Russian Economic Crisis Risks Stagnation, Degradation (Op-Ed).” Moscow Times Online in English, 25 Mar 2016, http://www.themoscowtimes.com. Accessed 31 Mar 2016.533 Butrin, "The Prime Minister's Eyes Opened to the Budget"534 Pismennaya, Yevgeniy, et al. "Medvedev's Concern That the Military Is Considered Too Expensive for the Country." Vedomosti Online, 22 Dec 2011, www.vedomosti.ru/newsline/news/1448040/oshibka_medvedeva. Accessed 22 Dec 2011.535 Unattributed. “Russia's anti-crisis commission to soon consider support for auto industry.” Interfax, 6 Feb 2015, www.interfax.com. Accessed 6 Feb 2015.536 Ivankhnik, Aleksandr. "Resuscitation of Economic Council." Politkom, 22 Nov 2013, http://politcom.ru/.537 Falichev, Oleg. "A Contingency Order.” Voyenno-Promysh-lennyy Kuryer, 26 Jan 2015, http://vpk-news.ru/. Accessed 26 Jan 2015.538 Unattributed. "Russia is proud of you." Rossiya 24 Television, 17 Mar 2016. Accessed 17 Mar 2016. 539 Falichev, Oleg. "Soldiers to Order; Military Robots Being Rid of Outside Elements." Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer, 4 Jun 2015, http://vpk-news.ru/. Accessed 4 Jun 2015.540 Russian Federation Defense Ministry Press Service and Information Directorate. "Specialists from the Russian De-fense Ministry Main Directorate of Scientific Research Activity Are Taking Part in the Work of a Military Industry Conference on the Development of Robotics for the Security Agencies."

Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 2 Oct 2014, http://www.mil.ru. Accessed 2 Oct 2014.541 President of Russia. "Meeting on armed forces develop-ment on 9 Nov 2015 in Sochi." Official Website of the Russian Federation President, 10 Nov 2015, http://eng.kremlin.ru/. Accessed 10 Nov 2015.542 Unattributed. “Pace of fulfilling presidential instructions for military-industrial complex must be maintained - Putin.” Interfax, 12 May 2015, http://www.interfax.com. Accessed 12 May 2015.543 President of Russia. “Putin Chairs Meeting on Defence Procurement.” Official Website of the Russian Federation President, 15 May 2014, http://eng.kremlin.ru/. Accessed 15 May 2014.544 Safronov, Ivan. “Supreme decision-making commander.” Kommersant Online, 5 Sep 2014, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2559841. Accessed 5 Sep 2014.545 Safronov, Ivan and Kozichev, Yevgeniy. "The Supreme Decider-in-Chief: Vladimir Putin will also Head the Military Industrial Commission." Kommersant Online, 6 Sep 2014, http://kommersant.ru/. Accessed 6 Sep 2014.546 Unattributed. "Russian Scientists Present Unique Projects to the Ministry of Defense." ITAR-TASS, 4 Dec 2012.547 “Шойгу С Рогозиным Задумали Эксперимент.” Nezavisi-maia Gazeta, Issue 89, 29 Apr 2013. Accessed 29 Apr 2013.548 “Russia will develop strike weapons to defeat US missile defences – Putin.” Rossiya 24 Television, 10 Nov 2015.549 Gorenburg, Dmitry. “How is Economic Crisis Affecting Russian Military Modernization?” Russia Insider, 14 Apr 2016, http://russia-insider.com/en/how-economic-crisis-impacting-rus-sian-military-modernization/ri13882. Accessed 26 Aug 2016.550 Marakhonov, Vladimir. "So Who Among Us Favors Strong Russia? Conflict with Ukraine Has Cost Our Country Half Its Nuclear Potential.” Novaya Gazeta Online, 20 Jul 2015, www.novayagazeta.ru. Accessed 20 Jul 2015.551 Vyatkin, Yaroslav. "Hypersonic Weapons: Even Alien Invaders Have Failed to Help the United States." Argumenty Nedeli Online, 4 May 2016, http://argumenti.ru. Accessed 27 Jul 2016.552 Unattributed. “The Acceptance in the Inventory of the RS-26 ‘Yars-M’ Missile Complex Is Planned in 2017.” Vzglyad Online, 12 May 2016, www.vzglyad.ru. Accessed 12 May 2016.553 Litovkin, “The Army: They Will Test Sarmat Near the Hawaiian Islands: They Will Lay Out a New Route for the New Ballistic Missile." Izvestiya Online, 4 Jul 2016, www.izvestiya.ru. Accessed 4 Jul 2016.

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554 Unattributed. “Russia Test Fires ICBM to Target in Kazakh-stan.” Fars News Agency, 28 Dec 2013, http://www.english.farsnews.com. Accessed 21 Sep 2016.555 Summary of Reporting on Russian and FSU Nuclear Issues. Los Alamos National Laboratory, 1 Dec 2014. Accessed 27 Nov 2016.556 Marakhonov, "So Who Among Us Favors Strong Russia? Conflict with Ukraine Has Cost Our Country Half Its Nuclear Potential.”557 Litovkin, Dmitriy. “The Army: They Will Test Sarmat Near the Hawaiian Islands: They Will Lay Out a New Route for the New Ballistic Missile." Izvestiya Online, 4 Jul 2016, www.izvestiya.ru. Accessed 4 Jul 2016.558 Russian Space Web. Topol-M, online missile guide, 2 Nov 2014, www.russianspaceweb.com/topolm.html. Accessed 10 Sep 2016.559 Litovkin, “The Army: They Will Test Sarmat Near the Hawaiian Islands.”560 Unattributed. “Testing of heavy strategic missile ‘Sarmat’ to start promptly.” Interfax, 10 Aug 2016, www.interfax.com. Accessed 11 Aug 2016.561 Unattributed. “The Acceptance in the Inventory of the RS-26 ‘Yars-M’ Missile Complex Is Planned in 2017.” Vzglyad On-line, 12 May 2016, www.vzglyad.ru. Accessed 12 May 2016.562 Unattributed. "Rubezh Missile Will Enter Duty in a Year." Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, 12 May 2016, www.rg.ru. Accessed 12 May 2016.563 Gertz, Bill. “Russia Tests Hypersonic Glide Vehicle on Missile.” The Washington Free Beacon, 22 Apr 2016, http://freebeacon.com/national-security/russia-tests-hyperson-ic-glide-vehicle/.564 NASIC; “Ballistic & Cruise Missile Threat; 2013; http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a582843.pdf565 NASIC; “Ballistic & Cruise Missile Threat; 2013; http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a582843.pdf566 Unattributed. “Offensive weapons, Ballistic missiles, Russian Federation, R-29RM Shetal/Sineva (RSM-54/3M27).” Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, 18 Dec 2015.567 Litovkin, “The Army: They Will Test Sarmat Near the Hawaiian Islands.”568 Petrov, Vladimir. “Russia announces deployment plans for Bulava missile and Borey-class submarine.” Jane's Defence Weekly, 30 Sep 2008, www.janes.com.

569 Kristensen, Hans and Norris, Robert. “Russian nuclear forces, 2016.” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, vol. 72, no. 3, 13 Sep 2016, pp. 125–134.570 “OTR-21 Tochka.” Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OTR-21_Tochka. Accessed 16 Sep 2016.571 Unattributed. “SS-21 `Scarab' (OTR-21/9M79 Tochka).” Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, 19 Jul 2005, www.janes.com.572 Unattributed. “SS-26 'Stone' (9M720 Tender/Iskander-E).” Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, 19 Jul 2005, www.janes.com.573 Barabanov, Mikhail. "The Reason We Need a Combat Aircraft.” Odnako Online, 18 Aug 2011, http://odnakoj.ru/. Accessed 18 Aug 2011.574 Unattributed. "RF Long-Range Aviation Will Test New Cruise Missiles in 2014." RIA Novosti Online, 28 Jan 2014, http://ria.ru/. Accessed 28 Jan 2014.575 Khudoleyev, Konstantin, et al. “Serve Russia.” Zvezda TV, 9 Feb 2014.576 Unattributed. "Tactical Missiles Corporation to Showcase Modern Weapons.” Aviapanorama, 21 Aug 2013, Accessed 21 Aug 2013.577 Tactical Missile Corporation, http://eng.krtv.ru/about_eng. Accessed 18 Aug.578 Unattributed. “V. Putin summarized series of Meetings, Dedicated to Fulfillment of the GOZ and Outfitting the [State Armaments Program] RF Armed Forces with Modern ViVT.” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer, 9 Dec 2013, http://vpk-news.ru/. Accessed 9 Dec 2013.579 President of Russia. “Russian leader, Defence Plant Chiefs Discuss Production, Overhaul of Facilities.” Official website of the Russian Federation President, 29 Nov 2013, http://eng.kremlin.ru/. Accessed 29 Nov 2013.580 President of Russia. “Russian leader, Defence Plant Chiefs Discuss Production, Overhaul of Facilities.” Official website of the Russian Federation President, 29 Nov 2013, http://eng.kremlin.ru/. Accessed 29 Nov 2013.581 Yesin, Viktor. "Peace Vehicles—Part II: It Is Time to Eliminate the Gap Between Advanced Engineering Solutions and Defense-Industrial Complex Production Capabilities.” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer, 27 Feb 2015, http://vpk-news.ru/. Accessed 27 Feb 2015.582 Mardasov, Anton. “Voyevoda and Stilet Will Reach America Without Ukraine. How Far the Rupture with Kyiv Threatens the Effectiveness of Russian ICBMs and Cruise Missiles.” Moscow Svobodnaya Pressa, 24 Aug 15, http://svpressa.ru/war21/article/130231/. Accessed 30 Aug 2015.

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583 “Cruise Missiles: Kh-101/102.” Missile Threat: A Project of the George C. Marshall and Claremont Institutes, missilethreat.com. Accessed 18 Aug 2016.584 Capaccio, Anthony. “Russia Deploys Advanced Cruise Missiles in Major Navy Reboot.” Bloomberg, 30 Dec 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-30/rus-sia-deploying-advanced-cruise-missiles-in-major-navy-reboot. Accessed 18 Aug 2016.585 Capaccio. “Russia Deploys Advanced Cruise Missiles in Major Navy Reboot.”586 “U.S. Debates Cruise Missile Procurement.” Jane’s Intelli-gence Review, 7 Jul 2016.587 Akulov, Andrei. “Kalibr: Russia’s Naval System Upping Cruise Missile Game.” Strategic Culture Foundation, 24 May 2016, http://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2016/05/24/kalibr-russia-naval-system-upping-cruise-missile-game.html. Accessed 18 Aug 2016.588 Akulov. “Kalibr: Russia’s Naval System Upping Cruise Missile Game.”589 “Jane’s P-800 Oniks/Yakhont (SS-N-26 Strobile).” Jane’s Defense Industry-Weapons: Naval.590 Vyatkin, Yaroslav. "Hypersonic Weapons: Even Alien Invad-ers Have Failed to Help the United States." Argumenty Nedeli Online, 4 May 2016, http://argumenti.ru. Accessed 27 Jul 2016.591 Vyatkin, Yaroslav. "Hypersonic Weapons: Even Alien Invaders Have Failed to Help the United States." Argumenty Nedeli Online, 4 May 2016, http://argumenti.ru. Accessed 27 Jul 2016.592 Unattributed. “Russian Defence Ministry Praises New Ka-libr Missile launches on Syria targets.” TASS Russian News Agency, 9 Dec 2015, http://tass.ru/ed/defense/842799. Accessed 20 May 2016.593 Mukhin, Vladimir. “Russian Arctic Will Be Protected by the Triumf; Production of Aerospace Defense Assets Will Increase Tenfold in Near Future.” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 2 Mar 2016, http://www.ng.ru/. Accessed 4 Mar 2016.594 Kozhin. “Negotiations on sale of S-400 surface-to-air missile systems to China and India ongoing, but priority their supply to Russian Armed Forces.” Moscow Interfax, 18 Apr 16, http://www.interfax.com. Accessed 18 Apr 2016.595 “Concern PVO “Almaz-Antey”/Concern Aerospace Defense [PVO].” GlobalSecurity.org, 29 Mar 2016 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/concern-pvo.htm. Accessed 23 Aug 2016.

596 “Aerospace and Defense: Company Overview of Joint-Stock Company Concern Almaz-Antey.” Bloomberg, http://www.bloomberg.com/Research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapid=34169028. Accessed 23 Aug 2016.597 Unattributed. “Jane's, Sentinel Security Assessment – Russia and the CIS, Russia-Air Force.” IHS Jane’s 360, 10 Aug 2016, www.janes.com.598 Mukhin, Vladimir. “Russian Arctic Will Be Protected by the Triumf; Production of Aerospace Defense Assets Will Increase Tenfold in Near Future.” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 2 Mar 2016, http://www.ng.ru/. Accessed 4 Mar 2016.599 “Antey-2500 Long-range Air Defense Missile System.” Military Today, http://www.military-today.com/missiles/an-tey_2500.htm. Accessed 23 Aug 2016.600 “Pantsyr S1 Close Range Air Defense System, Russia.” Army-Technology.com, www.army-technology.com. Accessed 22 Aug 2016.601 Unattributed. “Jane's, Sentinel Security Assessment – Rus-sia and the CIS, Russia-Air Force.” IHS Jane’s 360, 10 Aug 2016, www.janes.com.602 Unattributed. “Jane's, Sentinel Security Assessment – Russia and the CIS, Russia-Air Force.” IHS Jane’s 360, 10 Aug 2016, www.janes.com.603 Unattributed. “Jane's, Sentinel Security Assessment – Russia and the CIS, Russia-Air Force.” IHS Jane’s 360, 10 Aug 2016, www.janes.com.604 “Aircraft industry of Russia: Military aircraft.” Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aircraft_industry_of_Russia#Mili-tary_aircraft. Accessed 2 Sep 2016.605 “United Aircraft Corporation.” Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Aircraft_Corporation. Accessed 2 Sep 2016.606 Gorengurb, Dmity. “Russia’s State Armaments Program 2020: Is the Third Time the Charm for Military modernization?” PONARS Eurasia policy memo, 12 Oct 2010.607 “Modernized Strategic Bombers to Debut in Victory Day Parade Over Moscow.” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 14 Apr 2016, janes.com. Accessed on 4 Aug 2016.608 Harress, Christopher. “Russia Tupolev 22M3 Bombers Up-grade: Modernized Jets to be in Service by the End of 2015.” International Business Times, 17 Jul 2015, www.ibtimes.com.609 “Modernized Strategic Bombers to Debut in Victory Day Parade Over Moscow.” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 14 Apr 2016, janes.com. Accessed on 4 Aug 2016.610 “Aircraft Upgrades/Tupolev Tu-160.” Janes, 15 Dec 2015, janes.com. Accessed 8 Aug 2016.

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611 Unattributed. “Russian Air Forces to Take Delivery of More than 10 Upgraded Tu-95 Bombers in Two Years.” Russian Avia-tion, 30 Mar 2015, www.ruaviation.com. Accessed 9 Aug 2016.612 Unattributed. “Russia Plans to Complete Tu-22M3 Bomber Modernization Program by 2019.” Russian Aviation, 12 Jan 2016, www.ruaviation.com. Accessed 2 Aug 2016.613 “Development of PAK-DA Bomber Moved from Preliminary Design State to Research and Development Work.” Russian Avi-ation, 2 Jul 2015, www.ruaviation.com. Accessed 8 Aug 2016.614 Jane’s Information Group, “Kuznetsov NK-321.” Jane’s Aero-Enginesm, Aero-engines - Turbofan, Russian Federa-tion, 4 May 16.615 Shapkin, Dmitriy. “They Have Pulled Out of the Dive: Combat Aircraft.” Kommersant Online, 21 Aug 2013, http://kommersant.ru. Accessed 24 Aug 2013.616 Litovkin, Dmitriy. “The Army: The T-50 Fighter Aircraft Is Ready for Series Production: The Delivery of the Aircraft to the Troops Will Begin in 2017.” Moscow Izvestiya Online, 15 Jun 2016, http://www.izvestia.ru/. Accessed 15 Jun 2016.617 Khodarenok, Mikhail. “Long Restrained, We Will Fly Quickly; Fifth-Generation Russian Fighter Will Be Serially Produced in 2017.” Moscow Gazeta.ru, 1 Sep 2016. Accessed 13 Sep 2016.618 Unattributed. “Nothing critical happens to Russian Heli-copters holding as result of imposition of Western sanctions.” Moscow Interfax, 8 Sep 2016, http://www.interfax.com/. Accessed 8 Sept 2016.619 Kramnick, Ilya. “Preserving the Heights: A Series of Ad-vanced Helicopters Must Help Russia to Not Lose Its Place in the World Market.” Moscow Vzglyad Online, 10 Dec 2012, http://www.vz.ru/. Accessed 20 Dec 2012.620 Unattributed. “Russian Helicopters business unaffected by extension of Ukrainian sanctions.” Moscow Interfax, 25 Oct 2016, http://www.interfax.com/. Accessed 25 Oct 2016.621 Fedorov, Konstantin. “Modernization of Russian Mili-tary-Transport Aviation: Russia's Military-Transport Aviation: Need for Radical Renewal.” Moscow Segodnya.Ru, 3 Jun 2015, http://www.segodnia.ru/. Accessed 5 Jun 2015.622 Fedorov, “Modernization of Russian Military-Transport Aviation.”623 Zhuravlev, Nataliya. “A Hope for a Trillion: Plans Were Expressed on the Sale of the Latest Version of the Veteran Transport.” Moscow Vzglyad Online, 26 Dec 2012, http://www.vz.ru/. Accessed 5 Jan 2013.624 “Jane’s World Navies – Russian Federation.” IHS Jane’s, 30 Jun 2016, pp. 27–28.

625 Unattributed. "Saylut Scientific Production Center Upgrades Test Stands for Ship Engines." RIA Novosti, 23 Aug 2016, www.ria.ru. Accessed 23 Aug 2016.626 Ishchenko, Sergey. “Squadron Losing Way: Construction of 17 Surface Combatants for Our Navy Under Threat of Disrup-tion.” Moscow Svobodnaya Pressa, 19 Mar 2015, http://www.svpressa.ru/. Accessed 26 Mar 2015.627 “Jane’s World Navies – Russian Federation.” IHS Jane’s, 30 Jun 2016, pp. 27–28.628 “Kuznetsov Overhaul Designed to Maintain Carrier Capa-bility While Russia Considers Future Carrier Options.” Jane’s Navy International, 30 Jun 2016.629 Litovkin, Dmitriy. “A Unique Dock Will Be Built to Accom-modate the Aircraft Carrier Admiral Kuznetsov.” Izvestiya On-line, 7 Jun 16, http://www.izvestia.ru/. Accessed 12 Jun 2016.630 Unattributed. “Shtorm aircraft carrier design to begin in 2020.” Moscow Interfax, 30 Jun 16, http://www.interfax.com. Accessed 1 Jul 2016.631 “Russia’s New Maritime Doctrine.” Jane’s Defense Weekly, 14 Aug 2015, p. 4.632 “Jane’s World Navies – Russian Federation.” IHS Jane’s, 30 Jun 2016, p. 31.633 “Jane’s World Navies – Russian Federation.” IHS Jane’s, 30 Jun 2016, p. 30.634 “Jane’s World Navies – Russian Federation.” IHS Jane’s, 30 Jun 2016, p. 30.635 de Larrinaga, Nick. “Return of the Bear: Russian Ground Forces Modernisation.” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 8 Mar 2016.636 de Larrinaga, “Return of the Bear: Russian Ground Forces Modernisation.”637 de Larrinaga, “Return of the Bear: Russian Ground Forces Modernisation.”638 Koryakin, Oleg. “T-80 Tank Is Being Modernized with Relikt and Sosna-U: Omsk Armorers Took on Modernization of T-80BV Tank.” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, 14 Jul 2016, http://rg.ru/. Accessed 15 Jul 2016.639 Golts, Aleksandr. “Higher Arithmetic of the Russian De-fense-Industrial Complex.” Moscow Yezhednevnyy Zhurnal, 15 May 2015, www.ej.ru. Accessed 18 May 2015.640 Frolov, Andrey. “An Obstacle for the Aircraft Carrier. The State Armaments Program to 2025 Fits Ill with Economic Re-alities.” VPK Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online, 16 Mar 2016, vpk-news.ru. Accessed 21 Mar 2016.

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641 de Larrinaga, “Return of the Bear: Russian Ground Forces Modernisation.”642 Fedyushko, Dmitriy. “BMP-3's Second Youth. Vehicle Designed a Quarter of a Century Ago Has Become the Basis for the Newest Developments.” VPK Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online, 23 Sep 2015, http://www.vpk-news.ru/arti-cles/27164. Accessed 26 Oct 2015.643 Frolov, Andrey. “An Obstacle for the Aircraft Carrier. The State Armaments Program to 2025 Fits Ill with Economic Realities.” VPK Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online, 16 Mar 2016, vpk-news.ru. Accessed 21 Mar 2016.644 Official government statement. “Preliminary Testing of State-of-Art Boomerang Armored Personnel Carrier Will Be Completed in 2016.” Moscow TASS, 3 Jun 2016, tass.ru/. Accessed 6 Jun 2016.645 de Larrinaga, “Return of the Bear: Russian Ground Forces Modernisation.”646 de Larrinaga, “Return of the Bear: Russian Ground Forces Modernisation.”647 de Larrinaga, “Return of the Bear: Russian Ground Forces Modernisation.”648 de Larrinaga, “Return of the Bear: Russian Ground Forces Modernisation.”649 “Ukraine mobility upgrades for Russian rocket launchers.” Jane’s International Defence Review, vol. 44, no. 3, Mar 2011, pp. 31–33.650 “Rosoboronexport outlines 2020 strategy.” Jane's Defence, Industry Market Intelligence, 18 Nov 2013.651 Safronov, Ivan and Dzhordzhevich, Aleksandr. “Demand Gives Rise to Armament -- Russian Military Exports Beat Records.” Moscow Kommersant Online, 23 Mar 2017, http://kommersant.ru/. Accessed 29 Mar 2017.652 Safronov, Ivan. “‘Our Goal is to Hold on to Russia’s Second Place in the Arms Delivery Sphere.’ Rosoboronexport General Director Anatoliy Isaykin Talks About 2013’s Results and the Prospects for 2014.” Kommersant Online, 27 Jan 2014, www.kommersant.ru. Accessed 27 Jan 2014.653 Unattributed. “Rosoboronexport's sales reach $6.5 bln in H1 (Part 2).” Interfax, 15 Aug 2013, www.interfax.com. Accessed 15 Aug 2013.654 Unattributed. “Arms export costs account for $2 bln - $2.5 bln in Russia's arms exports – Military-Technical Cooperation Service.” Interfax, 16 Jun 2015, www.interfax.com. Accessed 16 Jun 2015.

655 Unattributed. “Russia broadens geography of military produce exports in 2014 – service.” Interfax, 26 May 2015, www.interfax.com. Accessed 27 Mar 2015.656 President of Russia. “Russian President Addresses Arms Exports Commission Meeting.” Russian Presidential Website, 27 Jan 2015, www.eng.kremlin.ru. Accessed 27 Jan 2015.657 Unattributed. “Patrushev seeks broader military-technological cooperation within BRICS (Part 2).” Interfax, 26 May 2015, www.interfax.com. Accessed 26 May 2015.658 Safronov, Ivan. “’Our Goal is to Hold on to Russia’s Sec-ond Place in the Arms Delivery Sphere.’ Rosoboronexport General Director Anatoliy Isaykin Talks About 2013’s Results and the Prospects for 2014.” Kommersant Online, 27 Jan 2014, www.kommersant.ru. Accessed 27 Jan 2014.659 President of Russia. “Russian President Addresses Arms Exports Commission Meeting.” Russian Presidential Website, 27 Jan 2015, www.eng.kremlin.ru. Accessed 27 Jan 2015.660 President of Russia. “Russian President Addresses Arms Exports Commission Meeting.” Russian Presidential Website, 27 Jan 2015, www.eng.kremlin.ru. Accessed 27 Jan 2015.661 Vlahovic, Branko. "Price Tag of Russian Weapons After Syria." Belgrade Vecernje Novosti, 4 Apr 2016, www.novosti.rs. Accessed 4 Apr 2016.

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